

Public sector provision, governance and institutionalization: row summary

Evidence is mixed. Average effects are usually little or no effect, with a moderate harmful effect on willingness to participate in one Zimbabwe study, and moderate positive effects on economic security and norms opposing violence in a small number of single study settings.

Public sector provision, governance and institutionalisation interventions work with public institutions at national, subnational and local levels. Included studies cover:

- (1) local governance reform through training village heads on rules and conflict management, sometimes adding a civil society leader to create horizontal oversight;
- (2) state building packages in conflict affected areas that combine service delivery, peacebuilding and information provision, such as aid delivered through councils, citizen feedback and SMS information on projects;
- (3) post conflict recovery financing and programming, including Peace Building Fund support in Burundi focused on negotiations, elections, displacement and land dispute resolution;
- (4) integrated security and development strategies such as security only, sequential security then development, and simultaneous approaches, plus redistricting and donor aid coordination; and
- (5) education centred programmes intended to reduce recruitment into violence, including secondary school construction in Somalia and alternative basic education in Uganda.

Several of these are bundled programmes where public sector provision is one component of a wider package.

These interventions aim to improve state legitimacy and reduce conflict drivers by increasing accountability, transparency and procedural compliance, reducing bias and corruption, and improving equitable access to services and dispute resolution. Information interventions aim to shift perceptions and behaviours by increasing awareness of government priorities and enabling feedback. Post conflict and multilateral packages aim to stabilise politics through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, humanitarian support, electoral assistance and budget support, which may reduce grievances and opportunities for armed mobilisation. Security first and sequencing strategies aim to reduce violence by establishing order before, or alongside, development and reconstruction. Education programmes are expected to provide alternatives to armed involvement and strengthen social norms that oppose violence.

There are moderate positive effects on economic security and social norms regarding violence and atrocities, but effect sizes for most outcomes are small and sometimes negative. Findings are context specific, and several come from bundled interventions so it is not possible to isolate the contribution of public sector provision alone.

- **Economic security:** $g = 0.17$ (moderate effect) in Burundi. This estimate comes from Peace Building Fund programming that bundled political negotiations, election support, reintegration and livelihoods, so it cannot be attributed to any single component.
- **Social norms regarding violence and atrocities:** $g = 0.11$ (moderate effect) in Somalia. The Somali Youth Learners Initiative combined secondary education expansion with leadership, conflict resolution and civic engagement activities, and the estimate reflects the full programme.
- **Government performance:** $g = 0.10$ (moderate effect) across five studies in multiple countries. Effects varied by intervention type and context: governance training showed small improvements in procedure adherence, while aid and SMS information produced minor and sometimes weaker effects in contested areas.
- **Access to justice, rights and public services:** $g = 0.06$ (small effect) in Zimbabwe. Training that added a civil society leader to village head training improved dispute management and reduced political bias in some service decisions compared with training village heads alone.
- **Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution:** $g = 0.04$ (little or no effect) in Burundi. Peace Building Fund work on displacement reintegration and land dispute mediation showed only very small average change, and the programme was bundled.
- **Food security and nutrition and health security:** $g = 0.04$ (little or no effect) in the Philippines. Peace and Development Teams combined security presence with development activities and reported a very small reduction in child malnutrition.
- **Nature and scale of violence or atrocities:** $g = 0.02$ (little or no effect) across five studies. Average effects were close to zero, but there was substantial variation: some approaches such as security only or sequential strategies were reported as more effective than simultaneous approaches, and redistricting and aid coordination effects differed by local political conditions.
- **Civic participation:** $g = -0.01$ (little or no effect, slightly harmful) in Zimbabwe. The average effect on legitimacy and participation was marginally negative; adding a civil society leader to training partially mitigated negative perceptions.
- **Willingness to participate or help:** $g = -0.13$ (moderate harmful effect) in Zimbabwe. The intervention reduced reported willingness to participate or help, including community leader involvement in distributing food aid, with limited evidence on why this occurred.
- **Educational and political security:** Both of these outcomes have positive qualitative findings in Mozambique linked to a United Nations package including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, humanitarian assistance, political and electoral support and budget support. Effects are bundled and confidence is low.
- **Physical security:** Positive qualitative findings in Uganda for Alternative Basic Education Karamoja, described as reducing incentives for child involvement in cattle raiding and armed groups through flexible, culturally adapted schooling.

Overall confidence is low. Many outcomes rely on one study, sometimes with many effect sizes from the same programme, and several findings come from complex packages that bundle multiple components, limiting causal attribution. There is also meaningful heterogeneity by conflict context, local politics and implementation approach, particularly for violence outcomes and for aid and information interventions. Outcome measures are often perception based and follow up periods are limited. Future evidence would be strengthened by clearer intervention descriptions, longer follow up, and designs that separate service provision from accompanying security, political or peacebuilding components.

Effect sizes reported for public sector provision, governance and institutionalisation interventions

Outcome	Effect size g	Effect category	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Economic security	0.17	Moderate effect	1	34
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.11	Moderate effect	1	12
Government performance	0.10	Moderate effect	5	20
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.06	Small effect	1	12
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.04	Little or no effect	1	38
Food security and nutrition and health security	0.04	Little or no effect	1	1
Intermediate social cohesion	0.04	Little or no effect	1	2
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.02	Little or no effect	5	18
Feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.00	Little or no effect	2	70
Civic participation	-0.01	Little or no effect (slightly harmful)	1	12

Willingness to participate or help	-0.13	Moderate harmful effect	1	2
Educational security	Not reported	Not reported (qualitative)	1	Not reported
Physical security	Not reported	Not reported (qualitative)	1	Not reported
Political security	Not reported	Not reported (qualitative)	1	Not reported
