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TURNING EVIDENCE INTO IMPACT

*A Guide to Evidence Based Approaches for Preventing
Conflict and Atrocities*

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Glossary

Cell-wise summaries- Cell-wise summaries refer to syntheses of evidence for each *cell* in an Evidence Gap Map, where each cell represents a specific combination of an intervention category and an outcome category. For example a cell wise summary of the impact of peace education on educational outcome.

Row-wise summaries- Row-wise summaries provide an overview of the evidence related to a particular intervention category across all outcome categories within the Evidence Gap Map (EGM). In other words, a row-wise summary synthesizes the research findings and evidence strength for all outcomes associated with that specific intervention. For example a summary on policing and public security intervention to all core outcomes relating to improved diplomatic relations, access to justice, and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and secondary outcomes related to human security outcome and community and state governance group.

Effect sizes: Effect sizes express the magnitude (or strength) and direction of the relationship of interest.

Pooled Effects: Pooled effect sizes are combined summary estimates calculated from multiple individual study effect sizes, to provide an overall measure of the magnitude of an effect across studies.

Core Outcomes: For this scope, outcomes related to violence and atrocity prevention and social cohesion are defined as core (or primary) outcomes.

Secondary Outcomes: In this project, outcomes related to good governance and human security are defined as secondary (or non-core) outcomes. They provide broader contextual insight but are not treated as the central measures of interest.

INTRODUCTION TO THE GUIDEBOOK

The *Conflict and Atrocity Prevention (CAP) Guidebook* is designed as a practical resource for policymakers, practitioners, and researchers seeking evidence-informed strategies to prevent conflict and atrocities. It compiles and synthesizes research across 37 sub-categories of interventions ranging from initiatives that strengthen socio-economic foundations to those focused on conflict management, mediation, and the creation of safe and inclusive environments. By consolidating existing evidence, the Guidebook aims to support more effective decision-making across a spectrum of direct and indirect prevention strategies.

Global conflicts have intensified in recent years. Since 2011, the world has witnessed a sharp rise in violence, with 56 active conflicts and over 50,000 battle-related deaths recorded in 2020 alone—the highest figure since 1945 (UCDP). Atrocities have occurred both within and outside warzones, including the persecution of minority and religious groups such as the Kurds, Christians in Sudan, Uyghurs in China, and Rohingya in Myanmar, alongside widespread human rights violations in countries such as Iran, Egypt, and North Korea. Civilians particularly women and children—bear the greatest burden of conflict, with over 10 million conflict-linked child deaths (Bendavid et al., 2021) and sexual violence compounding long-term trauma (Masset, 2022). Gallagher (2022) identifies 37 countries affected by mass atrocities since 2000, driven by factors including economic decline and ethnic and political divisions (Collier, 2006; Blattman, 2022). Global commitments such as Sustainable Development Goal 16 and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) underscore the importance of both rapid response and structural prevention to reduce the human toll of violence.

In response to the need for evidence-based approaches, the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), through its Migration and Conflict Directorate (MCD), commissioned the *Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Evidence and Gap Map (CAP EGM)*. This EGM catalogued 573 studies, including 460 quantitative, 89 qualitative, and 25 systematic reviews, to identify what works in conflict and atrocity prevention. Building on that foundation, the present Guidebook—an extension of the CAP EGM project—provides narrative, cell-wise syntheses that summarize the evidence available for each intervention–outcome area.

This extension project also had three main objectives:

1. **To simplify and consolidate** selected rows and columns from the CAP EGM to enhance usability, with each cell including a narrative synthesis of available evidence and reported effect sizes where applicable.
2. **To calculate and report effect sizes** from eligible quantitative primary studies, presented as standardized mean differences (SMDs) or odds ratios (ORs) and hosted in a public database, supporting faster evidence synthesis and reducing duplication across research teams.
3. **To launch an open-access digital platform**—the *Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Evidence Portal*—which brings together the EGM, narrative summaries, effect size data, and related

outputs to enable researchers, practitioners, and policymakers to access and apply this evidence more effectively.

Purpose and Structure of the Guidebook

This Guidebook focuses on the effectiveness of interventions—what works, and what does not—to prevent violence, conflict, and atrocities. Its purpose, together with the online Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Evidence Portal, is to help funders, policymakers, practitioners, and other stakeholders make evidence-informed decisions and easily locate the evidence most relevant to their needs.

The Guidebook summarizes the evidence on what works under six broad intervention categories:

- Safe environments
- Diplomacy, law, and accountability
- Conflict management and mediation
- Civil society
- Governance and justice institutions
- Socio-economic foundations

Each category comprises several sub-categories. The Guidebook provides an overview of available evidence and high-level summaries of findings. Detailed results are presented in Annex I, which outlines the effect of each intervention sub-category on each outcome, and Annex II, which provides a numerical overview of the study database.

Evidence and Methodology

The Guidebook is based on the Evidence and Gap Map (EGM) of studies examining interventions aimed at preventing conflict, violence, and atrocities. The EGM is structured as a matrix, with rows representing interventions and columns representing outcomes. Each study assesses at least one intervention–outcome relationship and is categorized accordingly. Studies evaluating multiple interventions or outcomes appear in all relevant cells.

To produce the cell-wise summaries, the following approach was used:

- If a cell contained only reviews, the summary was based on those reviews.
- If a cell contained both reviews and qualitative studies, the summary was based on the reviews.
- If a cell contained both reviews and quantitative studies, both were summarized.
- If a cell contained only quantitative studies, the summary focused on those.
- If a cell contained only qualitative studies, the summary was based on those studies.

Funding and Disclaimer

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SECTION 1: OVERALL FINDINGS


Overview of Evidence by Study Type (Quantitative, Qualitative, and Systematic Reviews):

The distribution of studies across cells reveals a significant concentration of evidence in a few areas while highlighting substantial gaps in others:

- Three cells contain more than 20 studies, including one examining disarmament, demobilization and reintegration's (DDR's) effects on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities and two related to sanctions—one on violence and atrocities and the other on economic security.
- Seven cells have more than 10 studies, covering topics such as military operations, diplomatic relations, intergroup relations, social funds, foundational state design and training, and job creation.
- One cell contains exactly 10 studies, focusing on the effects of social funds/community-driven development, reconstruction intervention on the feeling of trust.
- 31 cells have fewer than 10 studies, 13 contain exactly five studies, 87 cells have fewer than five studies.
- 81 cells contain only one study and the majority of cells (168 cells) have fewer than five studies, highlighting significant evidence gaps in these areas.

Among the total cells, there were 17% with large positive effects; 16% with moderate positive effects; 36% with small positive effects; 9% with no effect and 21% with harmful effects.

Fig 1: Overview of the effects size



Among the 228 cells in the map, 84% (n=193) were rated as having low confidence in the evidence, and 16% (n=35) were rated as having medium confidence. There were no cells with high confidence ratings. These confidence assessments reflect the overall strength and reliability of the evidence base within each intervention–outcome area (cell), rather than confidence in individual studies. Low confidence ratings often result from the limited number of available studies, variation in study quality, or inconsistency in findings across studies. This indicates that conclusions drawn from these areas should be interpreted cautiously, as the current evidence provides only limited support for robust or generalisable findings.

Table 1- Effect size findings in the cells

Effect	Range	Number of Cells	Low confidence study rating	Medium confidence study rating
Large effect cells	Above 0.2	39	32 (82%)	7 (18%)
Moderate effect	0.1 - 0.2	37	34 (92%)	3 (18%)
Small effect	0.01-0.1	83	68(82%)	15 (18%)
No effect	-0.01 - 0.01	20	17 (85%)	3 (15%)
Harmful effect	<-0.01	49	42 (85%)	7(15%)

INTERVENTIONS WHICH HAVE LARGE EFFECTS

We identified a total of 39 cells where interventions had large effects on outcomes. One cell with six studies, found the large pooled effects of social funds, community-driven development and reconstruction on access to justice, rights, and public services. Four cells, each with five studies, found large effects in the following areas: mental health and psychosocial support on food security and nutrition and health security, peace processes and diplomacy on diplomatic relations, sanctions on government performance, and training and job creation on feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity. A cell, with four studies, shows large effects of dispute resolution on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution. Furthermore, nine cells, each with three studies, highlighted large effects in areas such as transitional and restorative justice on sense of belonging and government performance. Seven cells with two studies and 13 cells with one study also showed large effects, including findings from dispute resolution, market development, and land reform interventions.

For instance, evidence from six studies on the effects of social funds and CDD, including Community Driven Reconstruction, on access to justice, rights, and public services showed improvements in local governance structures, with increased village development committees and access to counselling services. However, broader governance transparency and accountability effects remained weak. Outcomes which can help restore livelihoods improved, namely, public service infrastructure, particularly in education, water, and electricity, demonstrated significant gains, with higher school attendance, improved water access (15–34% increase), and expanded electricity coverage (26%). However, irrigation and transportation projects had limited or no lasting impact. Women's empowerment outcomes were mixed, with modest increases in association membership (6.4%), but little progress in local governance participation or legal rights. Service utilization, particularly in health access, remained unchanged in several cases. The effectiveness of these interventions was highly dependent on institutional stability, community participation, and long-term governance engagement.

Land reform interventions demonstrated the most significant large effects, appearing in seven cells. Evidence from three studies highlighted that land reform and natural resource management (NRM) initiatives enhanced economic security by improving tenure security, promoting long-term investments, and fostering financial stability. However, their effectiveness varied depending on contextual and implementation challenges. Evidence from one study found that land reform and NRM projects, particularly community-driven watershed restoration initiatives, contributed to educational security, increasing secondary school enrollment rates for girls. Another cell highlighted large effects on food security, nutrition, and health security, as community-driven watershed restoration initiatives improved dietary diversity and meal frequency. However, no significant improvements were observed in household access to drinking water.

A cell with three studies found large effects of land reform and NRM on feelings of trust and diversity. In Bolivia, participatory mapping increased trust levels, while in Indonesia, payments for ecosystem services (PES) fostered cooperation but did not significantly alter trust toward outsiders. In Mozambique, information campaigns improved trust in governance and civic engagement, but localized interventions led to elite capture. These findings emphasize that while NRM interventions can promote trust and inclusion, their success depends on equitable implementation, active community participation, and safeguards against elite control.

Evidence also suggests that dispute resolution interventions showed large effects in four cells. Evidence from four studies found significant impacts on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution. Programs such as CONCUR, IPNN, ECPN, RLS-I, and legal empowerment initiatives improved dispute resolution processes and trust in mediation. Additionally, IBN training, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and interfaith initiatives enhanced negotiation skills and reduced coercion in conflict settings.

INTERVENTIONS WHICH HAVE MODERATE EFFECTS

We identified a total of 37 cells where interventions had moderate effects on outcomes. Among these, 12 cells were based on a single study, indicating limited evidence. Fifteen cells contained evidence from fewer than five studies, while five cells had findings from five to nine studies. Only three cells included evidence from more than 10 studies. Among these, the cell with the highest number of studies comprised 17 studies on the effects of intergroup contact and peace education on willingness to participate or help. Other notable examples include 15 studies on job training and economic security and 11 studies on social funds and community-driven development (CDD) on willingness to participate.

For instance, evidence from 11 studies on social funds and CDD showed a pooled moderate effect on willingness to participate. Some interventions successfully increased civic engagement, participation in community groups, and contributions to public goods, particularly when emphasizing communication, democratic decision-making, and collaboration. However, several studies reported minimal or no sustained impact, with behavioral changes often limited to membership rather than active involvement.

Similarly, 15 studies examining the effects of training and job creation on economic security found moderate pooled effects. These programs—ranging from vocational training and business mentorship to financial assistance—generally led to higher employment rates and increased incomes. Notable cases include Liberia’s agricultural training program, where 77% of participants engaged in farming, and Tanzania’s RukaJuu! initiative, which raised earnings by 146% through entrepreneurship training. Additionally, public works programs like India’s NREGA played a critical role in stabilizing incomes during economic shocks. However, the impact was mixed in fragile and gender-unequal settings, where access to decent work remained constrained despite training opportunities.

The largest cell, with 17 studies, examined the moderate pooled effect of intergroup contact and peace education on willingness to participate or help. The evidence suggests that intergroup contact interventions can improve attitudes and increase engagement, though the effects vary. Longer programs incorporating behavioral reinforcement led to more sustained changes, while short-term interventions often resulted in temporary attitudinal shifts. Structural and perspective-taking interventions had only modest effects, indicating that the success of such programs depends on their design, duration, and context.

These findings highlight that while interventions with moderate effects can contribute to positive outcomes, their impact often depends on program design, contextual factors, and sustained engagement.

INTERVENTIONS WHICH HAVE SMALL EFFECTS

Most of the interventions studied showed a small pooled effect, with 88 cells indicating small effects. These include one cell with 26 studies on DDR programs and their impact on violence, another with 15 studies on military operations, eight cells with 10 or more studies, 16 cells with fewer than 10, six cells with five, 28 with fewer than five, and 25 with a single study.

One cell, containing 26 studies on the effects of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs and Peace Support/Keeping Operations on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities, showed small pooled effects. DDR programs and peacekeeping operations influence conflict dynamics by reducing violence and stabilizing postwar environments. UN peacekeeping presence shortens conflicts in fragmented settings and decreases battle deaths, while UN police effectively lower postwar violence. However, while peacekeeping reduces violence, it does not end conflict, as violence often transforms into other forms of instability. The success of interventions depends on mission size, mandate, and coordination with mediation efforts. Peacekeeping reduces electoral violence and atrocities, but its long-term impact on sustaining peace remains uncertain, particularly in complex conflicts with persistent security challenges.

Similarly, the cell with 10 studies on the effects of social funds, community-driven development, and reconstruction on trust and acceptance of diversity showed small effects. These interventions—ranging from block grants and infrastructure projects to civic engagement initiatives—produced localized improvements but no sustained impact on broader social cohesion. Trust levels remained largely unchanged, with slight increases reported toward specific groups like NGOs or local leaders. Acceptance of diversity showed localized improvements, particularly in interethnic and interreligious relations, but effects were often short-lived.

The cell with three studies on security sector reform interventions and their effects on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities also indicated small pooled effects. Security-focused strategies—such as Security-Only, Sequential, and Simultaneous approaches—were examined, along with sector security reforms like transitioning from international to local forces and Colombia's ComunPaz program, which replaced rebel governance and improved justice in FARC-dominated areas. Security-Only and Sequential strategies were more effective in terminating conflicts and maintaining peace than Simultaneous approaches. ComunPaz reduced community disputes, and violence decreased by 10% under Afghan local security initiatives.

The cell with two studies on the effects of foundational state design processes, transitional political processes, and election support interventions on social norms regarding violence and atrocities showed small effects. Election support interventions, including election education events and civic engagement activities, influenced voter empowerment and willingness to use political violence. Town meetings, popular theatre, and door-to-door material distribution promoted electoral participation and governance legitimacy while discouraging violence. Studies in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire consistently demonstrated the effectiveness of these interventions.

The cell with one study on public sector provision, governance, and institutionalization interventions and their effects on food security, nutrition, and health security also showed a small effect. The Armed Forces of the Philippines' Peace and Development Teams (PDT) program reduced child malnutrition in conflict-affected areas by 30% within three years, with lasting effects observed for at least seven years.

Finally, the cell with eight studies examining the effects of market development and macroeconomic policy on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities showed small pooled effects. While foreign aid and economic liberalization can reduce violence by addressing economic grievances and fostering stability, they may also exacerbate violence by increasing inequalities, fostering dependency, and becoming targets for insurgents. The effectiveness of these interventions depends on aid allocation, governance capacity, and complementary security measures. Some interventions successfully reduced violence, while others contributed to prolonged conflict. Economic policies such as trade liberalization promote long-term growth but may heighten short-term inequalities, increasing conflict risks. Tailored, well-coordinated approaches are necessary to ensure economic policies contribute to sustainable peace and development.

INTERVENTIONS WHICH HAVE NO EFFECTS

We found 20 cells where interventions had no effect on outcomes. Among these, six cells were based on a single study, while nine cells had fewer than five studies. Additionally, four cells contained fewer than ten studies, and one cell, with 11 studies, examined the effects of diplomatic recognition and other diplomatic efforts on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities. The diplomatic interventions cell, which analyzes evidence from 11 studies, assessed the impact of advocacy, sanctions, compensation, blacklisting, and economic programs on violence and atrocities. The findings revealed no pooled effect—while some studies reported a reduction in violence, others found that such interventions exacerbated repression or caused unintended economic and social disruptions. However, diplomatic scrutiny that combines both positive and negative feedback appeared to hold some promise for human rights improvements. The variation in outcomes stemmed from differences in intervention scale, type, and context, with some cases leading to increased violence or economic instability, particularly in fragile regions.

Similarly, policing and public security interventions also showed no significant effect on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities, based on evidence from six studies. For instance, integrated policing in Iraq successfully reduced ethnic tensions and support for anti-government violence by signaling fairness, while an increase in police presence in Afghanistan failed to curb election-related violence. Moreover, community policing initiatives across six countries demonstrated no measurable reductions in violence or improvements in trust or cooperation.

Additionally, eight studies examined the effects of social funds, community-driven development (CDD), and reconstruction interventions on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities. The findings indicated no significant impact on reducing violent incidents, insurgent attacks, or conflict casualties. While some studies suggested weak reductions in violence under specific conditions—such as small-scale aid projects or targeted governance support—others found that certain programs inadvertently increased conflict casualties, highlighting the potential unintended consequences of development interventions in fragile settings.

These findings underscore the complex and context-dependent nature of interventions, where factors such as implementation design, local conditions, and political dynamics can influence their effectiveness or lead to unintended outcomes.

INTERVENTIONS WHICH HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS

A total of 44 cells identify adverse effects of interventions. Among them 84% of the cells have a low confidence rating in study findings. The largest cell, with 24 studies, indicates that sanctions have adverse effects on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities. Another cell, containing 21 studies, highlights that sanctions have an adverse pooled effect on economic security. Additionally, 11 studies suggest that foundational state design has adverse effects on nature and scale of violence and atrocities. Further, there are three with less than 10 studies, 18 cells have five and fewer than five studies and 17 cells contain only one study. For instance, media and communication interventions have an adverse impact on economic security (one study). A study on radio programming under the Peace through Development II (PDEV II) program negatively impacted economic security, as the focus was more on political and social transformation rather than economic stability (Finkel, 2018).

Similarly, civil society capacity-building and civic engagement initiatives have shown adverse effects on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities. This finding is based on a single study examining poverty alleviation transfers in Xinjiang under China's 8-7 Plan (1994–2000). While the transfers led to increased local government spending on security (15%) and administration (10%), ethnic tensions persisted (Cheng, 2021).

Furthermore, civil society capacity-building pooled findings from five studies indicate that the intervention had adverse effects on civic participation. While local political engagement and voter coordination improved, leading to increased awareness and participation in civic activities, some initiatives reduced parochial voting and vote monopolization. Conversely, national-level political participation remained unchanged, and effects on democratic values, institutional trust, and decentralization support were limited or even negative.


Evidence on dispute resolution interventions also shows pooled adverse effects on social norms regarding violence or atrocities. Findings from two studies on the YE Peace Program in Niger and Conflict Management for Syrian Refugees in Jordan indicate that while these interventions aimed to reduce violence by fostering social cohesion and intergroup cooperation, they inadvertently supported political violence in certain contexts and revealed a tendency to accept violence.

Additionally, findings from three studies suggest that intergroup contact and peace education interventions have pooled adverse effects on economic security. In Lebanon and Liberia, these interventions did not lead to significant employment or investment gains, nor did they enhance property security or economic investment in Liberia. However, studies in Uganda reported modest improvements in business profits and household well-being, highlighting the mixed and uncertain nature of these economic impacts.

WHERE IS EVIDENCE CONCENTRATED ACROSS INTERVENTION TYPES


CAP aims: The majority of studies (n=444; 78%) were of interventions with explicit conflict prevention (CP) aims (Figure 7). A significant proportion of studies were conducted of interventions that implicitly aimed to prevent both violent conflict and atrocities (CP/AP) (n=100; 18%). Only 25 studies (4%) were of interventions with solely atrocity prevention (AP) aims.

Figure 2: Distribution of studies by conflict and atrocity aims




Geography: By far the largest number of studies in any single global region were of interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (n=204; 36%), the greatest being in Liberia (n=37; 6%), reflecting the relatively greater number of active and dormant violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere.[1] However, when examining studies by country, we found relatively large numbers of studies of interventions with explicit conflict prevention aims in other parts of the world including Palestine (n=49; 9%), Afghanistan (n=32; 6%), and Colombia (n=29; 5%). A further 88 studies (15%) were conducted using global or regional data. Of the studies conducted with atrocity prevention aims, either explicitly or implicitly, 66 (12%) were done using global or regional data, while the largest number of studies in a single country was in Rwanda (n=19; 3%).

Figure 3: Global distribution of studies



Targeted populations: The majority of the studies were conducted among the general population, targeting and collecting data from civilians. Although a significant minority (n=52; 9%) were conducted among vulnerable groups (13 studies (2%) of women, 25 (4%) of children, 9 (2%) of displaced persons) and 35 studies (6%) collected data from combatants or ex-combatants (Figure 11).


Figure 4: Distribution of studies by study target group



Interventions

Intervention type: The majority of interventions evaluated were direct in nature (n=373; 62.27%). That is, most evaluated interventions that sought to respond to a specific violent conflict or atrocity directly (Figure 12). In total, 226 studies (37.73%) evaluated the effects of indirect interventions that sought to address wider drivers of violent conflict and atrocity.

Figure 5: Distribution of studies by type of intervention




Note: N=603 because some studies evaluated the effects of multiple-component interventions, which could be coded as both direct and indirect.

Intervention groups: Across the six intervention groups specified in the framework, the most common intervention group evaluated was conflict management and mediation (n=165; 29%), followed by diplomacy, law, and accountability (n=146; 25%), socio-economic foundations (n=114; 20%), and safe environments (n=96; 17%) (Figure 13). Notably, we found the fewest studies within the civil society intervention group (n=48; 8%). Most common interventions largely followed the overall trend identified above.

Intervention strategies: The most common interventions evaluated were intergroup contact (n=70; 42% of the conflict management and mediation group). For example, Alan et al. (2020) evaluated the impact of an educational intervention to build inter-ethnic cohesion in Turkish school. This was followed by peacekeeping operations (n=47; 49% of the safe environments intervention group. For example, Fjelde & Smidt (2022) evaluated the effects of a peacekeeping operation on the risk of electoral violence globally. These were largely interventions with CP aims. Sanctions (n=57; 39% of the diplomacy, law and accountability group) was the third most common intervention, which was also the most common approach with explicit AP aims (n=13; 50% of the all 26 AP studies). This was followed by peace processes and diplomacy (n=40; 27% of the diplomacy, law and accountability group), and peace education (n=47; 28% of the conflict management and mediation group). Under socio-economic foundations, the largest numbers of studies were in the areas of cash transfers (n=28; 25% of this intervention group), land reform (n=23; 20%), market development and macro-economic policy (n=19; 17%), training (n=17; 15%) and employment creation (n=18; 16%).

Figure 6: Distribution of studies according to intervention groups



Outcomes


Types of outcomes: Studies evaluated both core (n=629; 110%) and secondary outcomes (n=499; 87%), which suggests some interest in analysis of causal pathways. The most common outcome group reported on was violence and atrocity prevention (n=335; 58%). This was followed by human security (n=233; 41%), social cohesion (n=191; 33%), and community and state governance (n=133; 23%) [3]. This trend was largely due to evaluations of programmes with explicit CP aims. Studies evaluating AP programming largely considered human security outcomes (n=14; 54% of all the AP studies).

Core outcomes: The largest number of core outcomes reported were on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities (n=206; 64% of the violence and atrocity prevention outcome group); 164 (48%) were for CP aims and (15%) were for AP or mixed AP/CP aims. For example, Corboz et al. (2019) focused on violence against children in war-affected Afghanistan reporting two measures: 'nature and scale of violence or atrocities' and 'sexual and gender-based violence', under the outcome domain violence and atrocity prevention. Relatedly, 74 studies (22% of the violence and atrocity prevention outcome group) reported on social norms around violence. Changes in social cohesion outcomes were also reported in many studies, especially feelings of trust (n=132; 69% of the outcome group) and willingness to participate or help others (n=56; 29%).

The least common core outcomes evaluated by studies were changes in the nature and level of diplomatic relations (one of the exceptions being Ruggeri et al. (2013), which evaluated the effect of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa on levels of cooperation at different levels), and sexual and gender-based violence, each which were evaluated by only three studies (1% of the violence and atrocity prevention outcome group). In the case of AP-interventions, several core outcome gaps were identified, including peaceful dispute resolution, sexual and gender-based violence.^[4]

Secondary outcomes: The most common secondary outcomes evaluated by studies were economic security (n=104; 45% of the human security outcome group) and government performance (n=92; 69% of the community and state governance group). These secondary outcomes also reflect those evaluated in studies of interventions with AP explicit aims. Food security and nutrition (n=7; 3% of the human security group) and transitions of power (n=3; 2% of the community and state governance group) were the least common secondary outcomes evaluated by the evidence base. Again, secondary outcome gaps for interventions with AP aims were found, including social safety nets, educational security and political security.

Figure 7: Distribution of studies by core and secondary outcomes evaluated



SECTION 2: WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE AND WHAT DOES IT SAY

what do the row-wise summaries reveal

We worked on row-level summaries for all 27 subcategories within six main intervention categories relevant to policy. For each subcategory, we developed summaries that synthesize what existing research shows about different types of interventions and their effects across a range of outcomes. These summaries illustrate where interventions have demonstrated positive results and where significant evidence gaps remain.

SAFE ENVIRONMENT

1.1 Policing and public security

The role of the police in persevering law and order is a central function of the state. Interventions may extend policing to areas which have previously been underserved, and so bring the rule of law and reduce violence. Policing interventions may also be introduced in post-conflict settings, following a transitional period from international peacekeepers to the national police force. Finally, the interventions may change the nature of policing, which includes empowering citizens to act as police, introducing community policing which builds local partnerships to enhance cooperation and engagement, and problem-oriented policing which focuses on specific problems related to crime and violence.

The presence of police can increase physical security, with both community policing and problem-oriented policing proving effective in African settings. But a study of community policing in six countries found no effects. Further research is needed to understand the role of intervention design and context in explaining these differences.

There are only small or no effects on other outcomes. Community policing does not increase trust in the police. And where there is little trust in the police, then effects can be negative, as was the case in Afghanistan, where a large police presence reduced election turnout and the use of state dispute resolution. In Papua New Guinea, the creation of police auxiliaries did increase the use of state dispute resolution, but did not displace recourse to non-state dispute resolution through traditional authorities.

And there is a negligible effect on violence and atrocities, suggesting that such phenomena are beyond the capacities of regular police forces.

Table 2 - Effect of policing and public security

Outcome sub-domain	Effect size	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Government performance	-0.004	5	21
Access to justice	0.045	2	4
Political security	0.034	1	2
Physical security	0.453	3	22
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	0.007	6	20

1.2 Military operations

Military operations are any efforts that involve the use of a state's armed forces to prevent, de-escalate or resolve a violent conflict or atrocity, usually resolving the conflict in favour of one of the parties – which is called a biased intervention. This excludes peacekeeping missions provided by multilateral forces, which are intended to be unbiased. Military operations include operations where armed forces are engaged in combat and those that do not have primary objectives to engage in combat (e.g. the presence of armed forces in specific locations or for training). This also includes cyberwarfare operations when delivered by a state's armed forces.

Military interventions and support are expected to reduce violence by ending or reducing conflict, either by the threat of force or the actual use of force. When one side of the conflict receives external support, other combatants may be more willing to enter into negotiations (that is diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution). Military operations are expected to bring peace and stability to areas, allowing governments to deliver services and put safety nets in place, thus improving citizen perceptions of government. The presence of outside troops can may improve observation of human rights.

The evidence does not support these theoretical expectations. Overall, there is a small negative effect on violence, which undermines the possibility of other effects such as social safety nets, and economic security. However, some forms of military intervention in certain contexts – notably drones in Pakistan – have reduced violence. And anti-terrorism efforts by the Kenyan government improved confidence in government, notably amongst Somalis. In addition, military support has a moderate effect on the likelihood of negotiations (though biased support for the government reduces this likelihood), and support by democracies improves respect for human rights, though this effect can be offset if a conflict becomes more intense.

Table 3 - Effect of military aid

Outcome sub-domain	Effect size	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Government performance	0.138	1	17
Social safety nets	-0.005	1	2
Political security	0.114	1	2
Economic security	-0.015	2	35
Physical security	0.453	1	2
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.107	2	24
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	-0.013	15	53

1.3 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and peace support/peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping is most effective in establishing stability which allows delivery of services, including a functioning justice system, which is usually not possible during conflict. Access to justice, rights and public services is the only outcome with a large positive effect.

Peacekeeping also supports achieving peaceful dispute resolution – though this depends on providing mediation together with peacekeeping. Diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution and transitions of power are moderately positively affected by peacekeeping interventions..

Table 4 - Effect sizes from Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)

Outcome Category	Effect size	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.351	1	4
Diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	0.160	8	32
Transitions of power	0.138	2	6
Sense of Belonging	0.094	1	8

Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.094	3	7
Educational security	0.078	2	11
Food security and nutrition	0.070	1	6
Economic security	0.061	7	33
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.060	1	3
Social cohesion	0.060	1	6
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.058	9	54
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.041	2	17
Physical security	0.034	2	6
Civic participation	0.024	2	5
Government performance	-0.066	3	12
Sexual and gender- based violence	-0.295	1	2

Note: A positive effect size indicates an improvement, e.g. less violence, and a negative effect size indicates an adverse effect.

Whilst there are positive effects from DDR and PKOs/PSOs in reducing violence, the effects are small and there are several moderators. The success of interventions depends on mission size, mandate, and coordination with mediation efforts.

Overall, a UN peacekeeping presence shortens conflicts especially in fragmented settings (i.e. with a large number of combatant groups) and decreases battle deaths, while UN police lower post war violence. But average effects are small, partly as peacekeeping reduces violence but does not end it. After a ceasefire or peace agreement, violence often transforms into other forms of instability. Police officers rather than military are more effective in post-conflict settings. But there is a very small effect on physical security. There is also a large adverse impact on sexual and gender-based violence, which is mainly - though not solely - perpetrated by rebel forces.

Peacekeeping reduces electoral violence and atrocities, but its long-term impact on sustaining peace remains uncertain, particularly in complex conflicts with persistent security challenges, e.g. Sudan and Somalia.

Peace support/keeping operations, particularly peacekeeping operations and the presence of peacekeepers, have a positive effect on the feelings of trust in the rule of law and acceptance of diversity. The presence of peacekeepers increased reliance on state authorities over non-state mechanisms for resolving crime and violence and increased cooperative decision-making and equitable resource allocation among ethnic groups. And DDR can achieve short-run effects on cohesion, but less on feelings of belonging; but these do not last. These interventions work better with women, and less well with more educated rebels, especially leaders.

There is low confidence in most findings in this row, both because of the low number of studies in most cells and because of low confidence in the included studies.

1.4 Support to civilians and non-state armed groups

Support to civilians and non-state armed groups includes any support provided to civilians or non-state groups to counter, mitigate, deter or avoid a threat and prevent violence in the context of an atrocity. This could include military assistance such as the provision of weapons, funds, logistics, military training and access to intelligence and sanctuaries, or the provision of other assistance, such as advice, funding, or providing material goods. It does not include aid for humanitarian or development purposes.

There is only one study in this cell, which is of the effect of provision of political training by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to its own members itself in Colombia. The study concluded that political training reduced civilian killings, as those who received the training were less likely to kill civilians than were those members receiving only military training or no training.

Table 5 - Effect of support to non-armed state groups

Outcome sub-domain	Effect size	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	0.78	1	2

DIPLOMACY, LAW, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 Diplomatic Efforts

The row covers diplomatic recognition and other diplomatic efforts made to legally recognise or influence a state or political entity, their acts, or accounts, in order to afford a state or group access to the rights, duties, and obligations of international law, as well as the ability to hold them accountable to international law. This could include support provided to a group or state to achieve formal recognition, efforts made to advocate for the recognition of a state or group, efforts made to encourage specific states to recognise a state or group or undertake or not undertake specific actions. It can include naming and shaming of conflict or atrocity perpetrators, or the official barring of legal proceedings against certain individuals or groups (official amnesties).

This intervention captures any other form of diplomacy that is not focused on a specific peace process. This could include diplomatic messaging or engagements in response to specific risks.

Included studies in this cell cover campaigns for governments with respect to human rights; diplomatic negotiations to end sanctions in Iran, and US requests to governments to extend control over ungoverned areas under threat of military intervention if they do not do so;

They also include field experiments (that is providing respondents with different information to determine how this affects their attitudes): one testing in-group versus out-group endorsements for peace settlements in Sudan, another how the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recognition of

Palestine as a non-member observer state affected Palestinian views on partition; and a third on how positive featuring Chinese aid and negative ones on the United States affect Indian attitudes to China.

The largest body of evidence is for violence and atrocities outcomes with 40 effect sizes from 11 studies. They cover a range of interventions including advocacy, sanctions, compensation, blacklisting, and economic programs. Overall, these programmes have no effect on violence and atrocities. But there is considerable variable in effects, so some approaches do work in some contexts – and others don't.

Diplomatic negotiations for sanctions relief in Iran improved the economic position of the country - as measured by stock market returns - especially for the elite. But a campaign to release named political prisoners increased the likelihood of their release. Overall, there is a moderate effect of campaigns on human rights.

The United States put diplomatic pressure on countries to extend their control over ungoverned areas, which are often training grounds for terrorists, with the threat of military intervention if they did not do so. A study of 47 countries in Africa found that generally there was little expansion of government into these areas. There was no significant improvements in public goods provision, such as water and sanitation, and a decline in infrastructure projects. However, there were improvements in some indicators such as voter turnout and under-five mortality.

Name and shame campaigns can improve human rights, although a general campaign by the EC had no effect. In contrast, a US campaign for named political prisoners significantly increased the chances of the named prisoners being released (physical security outcome).

Three studies consider public opinion. People's support for a peace settlement (measured as social norms) drops sharply if it is endorsed by an 'out-group' leader, whereas 'in-group' leader endorsements have no effect. Giving recognition to Palestine by the United Nations increased public acceptance of partition, but decreased willingness to make deals on territory (measures of the outcome peaceful dispute resolution). Finally, exposure to positive information about China's aid diplomatic efforts results in a moderate increase in feelings of trust toward China amongst Indian citizens, whereas negative information about the United States reduces trust toward all foreign countries, including China.

2.2 Peace processes and diplomacy

Peace processes and diplomacy have large beneficial effects on physical and economic security despite the small harmful association with violence and atrocities. There are moderate improvements in diplomacy and dispute resolution, and little or no average effects on civic participation and environmental security. Engagement of all relevant local stakeholders is important for successful interventions.

Peace processes and diplomacy refer to formal and informal efforts to prevent, de-escalate, or end armed conflict and reduce risks of atrocities. These interventions encompass not only supporting political institutions, but working with key actors to establish the preconditions for peace and avoiding the emergence or escalation of atrocities, including ceasefires, establishing national and community dialogues, and ensuring that marginalised groups, such as women, youth, and ethnic minorities, participate in the process.

Interventions in this evidence base include third-party mediation and facilitation (by the UN, regional bodies, states, or local actors); ceasefires (including localized or area-specific ceasefires); peace agreements and provisions (e.g., human-rights or gender provisions); informal and community peace accords and indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms; and complementary diplomatic instruments such as international election observation, peacekeeping and monitoring linked to negotiations, disarmament–demobilization–reintegration (DDR), humanitarian assistance, and donor budget support in post-agreement transitions.

Peace processes and diplomacy aim to reduce violence by enabling dialogue, lowering uncertainty, and creating credible commitments between conflict parties. Mediation can break negotiation stalemates, address information asymmetries, and help parties bargain over core incompatibilities. Ceasefires can pause hostilities and create space for talks; and local agreements can embed culturally legitimate rules for resource sharing and dispute resolution, reducing retaliation cycles. Diplomatic and implementation supports—such as peacekeeping/monitoring, DDR, electoral assistance, and budget support—are expected to strengthen compliance, protect civilians during transitions, and restore basic services and livelihoods. Effects are expected to vary by conflict phase, the design and inclusiveness of agreements, mediator leverage and neutrality, and state or locally rooted capacity to enforce commitments.

There are large beneficial average effects on physical security ($g=1.36$) and economic security ($g=0.63$), most often linked to informal and community agreements and related mechanisms that improve safety and equitable access to resources. Effects are moderate and beneficial for peaceful dispute resolution ($g=0.19$) and diplomatic relations ($g=0.337$), consistent with evidence that mediation increases negotiations, agreement signing, and conflict termination—particularly when paired with peacekeeping and monitoring. By contrast, the average association with the nature and scale of violence or atrocities is harmful ($g=-0.04$), reflecting mixed findings: some mediation or ceasefires reduce fatalities temporarily (especially when addressing core issues), while in other contexts peace processes coincide with fragmentation of rebel movements, violence displacement (either geographically, or other forms of violence such as crime-related increase), or selective targeting in areas with weak protection. On the other hand, local ceasefires sometimes reduce violence in neighbouring areas, Government performance shows a small beneficial average effect ($g=0.058$), while civic participation shows little or no effect ($g=0.001$). Environmental security shows little or no average effect ($g=-0.01$), but case evidence highlights potential environmental harms during post-agreement transitions when land governance and enforcement are weak.

Confidence in findings varies by outcome. The evidence base for diplomacy/dispute resolution and violence outcomes draws on multiple non-experimental impact evaluations (and some reviews), but causal interpretation is constrained by selection into mediation or agreements and context-specific implementation differences. Several outcomes (e.g., education security, food and health security, transitions of power, sense of belonging) rely mainly on single-case qualitative studies and should be treated as low-confidence signals of plausible pathways rather than generalizable effects. Overall, the pattern of findings suggests that peace processes and diplomacy can deliver substantial benefits—especially for security and livelihoods—when interventions are locally legitimate, address core conflict drivers, and are matched with credible implementation and protection capacity; where these conditions are absent, effects can be muted or can involve meaningful risks.

Table 6 - Effect of Peace processes and diplomacy

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Direction	Magnitude	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Physical security	1.422	Beneficial	Large effect	2	5
Economic security	0.63	Beneficial	Large effect	1	4
Peaceful dispute resolution	0.194	Beneficial	Moderate effect	5	19
Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	0.337	Beneficial	Moderate effect	1	3
Diplomatic relations	0.172	Beneficial	Moderate effect	1	12
Government performance	0.058	Beneficial	Small effect	2	6
Political security	0.001	Beneficial	Small effect	2	12
Civic participation	0.001	Beneficial	Little or no effect	1	12
Environmental security	-0.008	Harmful	Little or no effect	2	4
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	-0.04	Harmful	Small adverse effect	10	30

Note: Interpretation thresholds: $|g| < 0.05$ little or no effect; $0.05 \leq |g| < 0.10$ small; $0.10 \leq |g| < 0.20$ moderate; $|g| \geq 0.20$ large. Negative values indicate harmful effects in the coding used for these outcomes.

2.3 Human security law and International Criminal Court (ICC) or regional equivalents

Legal and accountability interventions can support peaceful dispute resolution, but impacts on violence, rights, justice, and survivor safety are often mixed and context-dependent, being undermined by political elites and with risks of backlash and intimidation.

Human security law + International Criminal Court (ICC) or regional equivalents refers to The use, revision, or development of law (including conventions, treaties, and related legal frameworks) together with the use of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or regional equivalents to investigate or prosecute individuals for serious international crimes (or similar grounds). In the included studies, the specific interventions are: (i) treaty ratification and domestic legal implementation; (ii) ICC investigations, indictments, arrest warrants and prosecutions; (iii) international or hybrid tribunals and internationalized prosecution support; and (iv) transitional or community justice processes that function as accountability mechanisms (e.g., community courts).

These interventions are intended to reduce conflict and atrocities by increasing accountability and deterrence (by raising expected costs for perpetrators), strengthening rule-of-law institutions and legal constraints, supporting survivor rights and access to remedies, and establishing shared rules and fora for peaceful dispute settlement. In practice, effects may be undermined when enforcement is not credible, when cooperation with investigations is weak, or when legal processes become politicized—potentially triggering backlash, strategic non-cooperation, and intimidation of witnesses or victims.

Where quantitative estimates are available, average effects vary in magnitude. There is a large beneficial effect on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution ($g = 0.44$), though prosecutions can undermine peace negotiations. There are large adverse effects on political security ($g = -0.31$) and the nature or scale of violence and atrocities ($g = -0.38$). Any positive effects of signing international conventions on physical security and violence lessens over time. Willingness to participate in negotiations is negatively affected as ethnic rivalries can be exacerbated ($g = -0.16$), and one study reports large harmful effect on mental health linked to participating in transitional justice ($g = -0.65$). Narrative findings in other outcome areas emphasize heterogeneity and implementation risks. Access to justice and justice outcomes are frequently described as constrained by domestic political incentives, lack of state cooperation, and capacity—leading to limited accountability or uneven delivery of remedies, even where legal frameworks exist. Government performance effects are described as mixed: legal accountability mechanisms can catalyze reforms or shifts toward greater domestic legal capacity in some contexts, but can also provoke political resistance, and deliberate undermining of international mechanisms. Physical security evidence highlights risks to survivors and witnesses (threats, retaliation, intimidation), indicating that protective measures are important to avoid harm. For SGBV and social protection-related outcomes, reviews emphasize that legal codification and accountability are important but insufficient alone; stigma, retaliation, and institutional constraints limit enforcement, and the evidence base is thin with few long-term evaluations—supporting calls for integrated, multi-sector approaches (legal accountability, protection or prevention, and survivor services) and more rigorous assessment.

Confidence in findings is generally low because the evidence base is small and diverse in design (often qualitative case studies or observational analyses), and results depend heavily on contextual factors such as conflict phase, political incentives, and whether enforcement is credible. Evidence also suggests mechanism-level differences matter (e.g., oversight versus prosecution, or the presence of credible witness protection), so pooled averages may not generalize across settings.

Table 7 - Effect of Human security law and ICC

Magnitude labels: <0.05 little or no effect; <0.1 small; 0.1–0.2 moderate; >0.2 large.

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Direction	Magnitude	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Political security (political terror / civil liberties)	-0.308	Harmful	Large	2	8
Nature and scale of violence/atrocities	-0.383	Harmful	Large	6	46
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.437	Beneficial	Large	3	53
Willingness to participate or help (intergroup cooperation)	-0.16	Harmful	Moderate	1	11
Food security/nutrition or health security (measured via emotional/mental health impacts of transitional justice)	-0.65	Harmful	Large	1	10

2.4 Sanctions

Sanctions have an adverse effect on violence and are consistently associated with worsening of rights, social cohesion, and economic wellbeing. Effects vary markedly by sanction design, regime type, and context.

Sanctions are any reaction adopted unilaterally or collectively by states against a perpetrator of an internationally unlawful act in order to ensure respect for and performance of a right or obligation, in order to prevent a conflict or atrocity from starting or escalating. Sanctions could be of an economic (e.g. trade embargo between one or more states, or the seizure of assets held by individuals or states), diplomatic (e.g. national or international travel bans, banning organisations through the use of proscriptions), or militaristic (e.g. restricted movement or no fly zones, regulation of arms sales, or nuclear controls) nature. The evidence in the included studies includes comprehensive economic sanctions, targeted or smart sanctions intended to affect key individuals rather than the population as a whole (for example asset freezes, travel bans, and sectoral financial restrictions), trade restrictions and embargoes, arms embargoes, and sanction threats as well as imposed measures. Several studies also examined sanction-like restrictions on specific goods or economic activities, such as dual-use

import controls and conflict-mineral trade regulations, and a small number evaluate the easing of restrictions on movement as a contrast case.

Sanctions are intended to change the behaviour of governments or armed actors by raising the economic and political costs of repression, conflict, or rights abuses, limiting access to finance, trade, and weapons, and signalling international disapproval. In principle, reduced resources and isolation could constrain the capacity to sustain violence or support abusive security forces and could incentivise negotiation, compliance, or institutional reform. In practice, sanctions can also trigger adaptation and evasion, shift rents and patronage networks, and prompt leaders to tighten control over media and civic space. Comprehensive measures can reduce household incomes and public revenues, worsen access to food and health services, and intensify grievances that may be mobilised either by the sanctioned regimes or opposition groups.

Evidence of effects is mixed across outcomes and frequently depends on sanction type and context. On the nature and scale of violence and atrocities, the meta-analytic estimate suggests a moderate harmful association ($g = -0.13$), with many studies linking economic sanctions to higher repression especially in authoritarian regimes and domestic terrorism, though there is also some evidence that arms embargoes are associated with lower conflict intensity in some settings. Short-term targeted interventions may improve human rights and reduce violence. Political security shows little or no overall average effect ($g = 0.027$), but this masks divergence: comprehensive and multilateral sanctions are often associated with worse civil liberties, discrimination, and physical integrity rights, while some evidence links democratic sanctions or selected United States sanctions to small improvements in democracy scores or women's emancipatory rights. Government performance shows a large average effect ($g = 0.288$), yet findings differ by regime type and policy objective, with studies describing weakened fiscal and administrative capacity in general, but regimes may shift in spending to protect politically important groups. Economic security and food and health security have effect sizes close to zero ($g = -0.001$ and $g = -0.005$), but the included studies frequently report harms such as increased poverty and inequality, reduced trade and investment, lower immunisation and health spending, and worse infant mortality in conflict-affected areas, suggesting heterogeneous effects that may cancel in pooled estimates. For civic participation ($g = -0.104$), threats of sanctions appear more likely to coincide with increased anti-government protest, whereas imposed sanctions are often associated with pro-government mobilisation and reduced opposition activity, especially where media censorship is high. Access to justice, rights, and public services are adversely affected ($g = -0.114$), driven by reduced press freedom and weaker private property rights, with larger harms under more comprehensive sanctions. Social cohesion outcomes are similarly adverse on average: trust and acceptance of diversity decreases ($g = -0.111$), and case evidence from the West Bank links easing of movement restrictions to shifts away from support for violence and toward political engagement, but these findings come from a single setting.

Confidence in findings ranges from low to medium across outcomes. Many results come from observational, cross-national analyses using secondary datasets, where sanctions are not randomly assigned and confounding is difficult to eliminate. Several outcomes rely on small numbers of studies, including single-study evidence for some social cohesion measures, and pooled estimates sometimes sit near zero despite consistent qualitative reports of harm, indicating substantial heterogeneity by sanction severity, duration, enforcement, and local political economy. Overall, the evidence provides consistent indications of adverse social and economic consequences. The evidence does not support sanctions resulting in reductions in violence or improvements in rights and governance, and there is

limited high-confidence evidence to guide which sanction designs avoid these harms in low- and middle-income contexts.

Table 8 - Effect of Sanctions

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Magnitude	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Government performance	0.288	Large	5	9
Social cohesion: Willingness to participate or help	-0.218	Large	1	1
Civic participation	-0.104	Moderate	2	11
Human security: Access to justice, rights, and public services	-0.114	Moderate	2	17
Political security	0.027	Little or no	6	19
Food security and nutrition and health security	-0.005	Little or no	2	13
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	-0.111	Moderate	2	3
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	-0.053	Small	1	5
Economic security	-0.001	Little or no	21	71
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	-0.13	Moderate	24	68

Notes: Magnitude categories are based on the absolute value of g. Less than 0.05 indicates little or no effect; 0.05 to less than 0.1 indicates a small effect; 0.1 to 0.2 indicates a moderate effect; greater than 0.2 indicates a large effect. The direction of g follows the coding used in the underlying studies and outcome measures, so the sign does not always map neatly onto desirable or undesirable change.

2.5 Aid Assistance and Conditionality

Aid is used directly to address conflict through a range of causal mechanisms. Aid can support the legitimacy of government, and so support stability, by strengthening institutions, improving governance, and a “hearts and minds” approach of providing public services. However, aid projects are usually concentrated around the capital, whereas conflict occurs in more outlying areas.

The evidence suggests that, in general, aid is not effective in reducing conflict and may even increase it. The four included studies, and the one narrative review, conclude there are adverse effects. The overall effect size for all studies is a small, adverse effect.

There is heterogeneity by type of aid and context. Military aid increases conflict. Aid is more likely to be more effective in relatively stable environments, but more likely to fuel it in unstable settings when combatants may seize aid, or attack aid-supported facilities. One study reports that “easily lootable aid” is associated with higher civilian fatalities.

In contrast, withholding aid is effective in persuading governments to comply with the condition which has triggered the sanctions – such as democratic transition. However, this effect weakens over time.

Table 9 - Effect of Aid assistance and conditionalities

Outcome sub-domain	Effect size	No. of studies	No. of effect sizes
Diplomatic relations	0.347	1	1
Economic security	0.052	1	11
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	-0.018	4	35

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION

3.1 Intergroup contact and peace education

Intergroup contact and peace education lead to moderate to large improvements in reduced violence, dispute resolution and non-violent norms, but small or harmful effects for some security, economic, and governance outcomes. Confidence in study findings is generally low.

Intergroup contact and peace education brings members of socially divided groups into structured interaction and combines this with content on non-violent conflict resolution and coexistence.

In the included studies, formats range from school and after-school curricula and workshops, to community-based civic education and alternative dispute resolution training, to facilitated dialogue and reconciliation activities (including volunteering and forum theatre). Some programmes also bundle psychosocial or economic elements such as mentoring, small transfers, or women’s empowerment services.

How the intervention is meant to work: Programmes aim to reduce prejudice and perceived threat through repeated, facilitated contact, perspective-taking, and narrative exchange, while building skills in mediation, negotiation, and informal dispute resolution. Peace education components seek to shift norms by increasing rejection of violence and strengthening knowledge of rights and responsibilities. Risks include surfacing latent disputes, provoking backlash when hierarchies are challenged, and limited effects on trust in state institutions when grievances are structural.

Evidence of effects: Pooled estimates suggest moderate reductions in violence and atrocities ($g = 0.15$; 8 studies) and large improvements in peaceful dispute resolution ($g = 0.203$; 3 studies), with several Liberia-focused ADR and civic education programmes reporting fewer unresolved land disputes and less property destruction. However, adverse effects are also reported in some settings, including increased interpersonal fights, extrajudicial punishment, and youth-elder tensions, indicating that some interventions may displace conflict or make it more visible. Social norms regarding violence show a large positive shift ($g = 0.442$; 13 studies), and intermediate social cohesion outcomes (for example, empathy and conflict-resolution skills) also show a large pooled effect ($g = 0.316$; 30 studies), but results are heterogeneous and often short-term. Participation-related outcomes are mixed: civic participation improves moderately ($g = 0.108$), while political engagement shows a small harmful directional effect in the same election-campaign study ($g = -0.04$). Economic security is slightly negative overall ($g = -0.089$), and perceptions of government performance show a very large harmful effect in one study ($g = -2.029$). Other outcomes show small effects on sense of belonging ($g = 0.089$) and educational security ($g = 0.086$), and near-zero harmful directional findings for perceived physical security ($g = -0.046$). Evidence on social safety nets is qualitative and suggests informal peer support networks, but pooled effect sizes are not reported.

Confidence in findings: Confidence is generally low across outcomes due to few studies in several cells, substantial variation in interventions and measures, and frequent reliance on self-reported indices and short follow-up periods. Some studies have unclear attrition reporting or limited external validity. Given the presence of null and adverse effects alongside positive findings, implementation should include realistic expectations, attention to context, and monitoring for unintended consequences.

Table 10 - Effect sizes for intergroup contact and peace education

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Interpretation	Studies (n)	Effect sizes (k)
Food, nutrition and health security	0.535	Beneficial - Large	2	10
Norms about violence and atrocities	0.442	Beneficial - Large	13	54
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.316	Beneficial - Large	30	190
Peaceful dispute resolution	0.203	Beneficial - Large	3	24
Willingness to participate or help	0.189	Beneficial - Moderate	17	87
Violence and atrocities (nature and scale)	0.150	Beneficial - Moderate	8	47

Civic participation	0.108	Beneficial - Moderate	1	8
Sense of belonging	0.089	Beneficial - Small	5	14
Educational security	0.086	Beneficial - Small	4	13
Political security	-0.040	Harmful - Little or no effect	1	2
Physical security	-0.046	Harmful - Little or no effect	1	3
Economic security	-0.089	Harmful – Small	3	67
Government performance	-2.029	Harmful – Large	1	7
Social safety nets (presence and quality)	Not reported	Positive (narrative)	1	Not reported

3.2 Media and communication

The effects of media and communication interventions were summarized from 18 included studies, mostly conducted in sub-saharan africa region. Radio was identified as the primary medium for media and communication interventions, as seen in programs like Peace through Development II (PDEV II) and Voices for Peace, which combined broadcasts with community activities and facilitated discussions on governance, corruption, and police-community relations. Other interventions, such as Kumbuka Kesho in the DRC and Pro-Peace Messaging in Burkina Faso, used role-modeling radio dramas and religious sermons to promote tolerance and collective action. In Mali, peace radio programs were integrated with governance initiatives, while FM broadcasts during the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency encouraged defections through logistical guidance and reassurances of reintegration. Additionally, various media formats—including video campaigns, storytelling, social media messaging, and paradoxical thinking interventions—were used to challenge extremist narratives, foster dialogue, and promote active civic engagement. Initiatives like the Rwanda Threshold Program (RTP) and Wuro Potal in Burkina Faso further emphasized the role of media in governance awareness and accountability.

Media and communication effects on access to justice, the Rwanda Threshold Program had a moderate effect, as submission boxes gained acceptance, signaling a shift toward indirect engagement with law enforcement. Media-driven efforts to enhance willingness to participate and help had moderate effects, with programs like Musekeweya radio soap operas in Rwanda promoting reconciliation but showing inconsistent influence on prosocial behavior.

Media and communication interventions had small effects on political security and civic participation. While programs like Peace through Development II (PDEV II) improved political knowledge among radio listeners, they had limited impact on broader political engagement. Civic participation initiatives, including Voices for Peace in Burkina Faso and Kumbuka Kesho in the DRC, showed small effects, with some interventions increasing collaboration with security forces, though results varied across contexts. In nature and scale of violence and atrocity prevention outcomes, FM radio broadcasts encouraging defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) had a small effect in reducing fatalities but led to unintended consequences, such as increased looting. Efforts to shift social norms around violence had small effects—while some reduced in-group superiority and promoted tolerance, others failed to change deep-seated ideological beliefs, with long-term interventions proving more effective. Intervention had a small effect on intermediate social cohesion outcome, improving fairness-based reasoning and intergroup trust in some cases, but persistent biases, trauma, and external conflicts often constrained impact. Effects on trust-building, feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity also showed small effects, with some radio dramas fostering reconciliation, enhanced intergroup trust, reduced social distance though others reinforced ethnic divisions. Media interventions had no effect on government performance, as efforts to improve transparency and institutional trust, such as the Rwanda Threshold Program, did not significantly influence public perceptions. Finally, media interventions had an adverse effect on economic security, as programs like PDEV II had no measurable impact on livelihoods, employment, or financial stability. Overall, while media interventions show promise in influencing civic engagement, trust, and social norms, their effectiveness depends on sustained efforts, targeted messaging, and contextual relevance.

Overall, while media interventions showed promise in influencing civic engagement, trust, and social norms, their effectiveness depended on sustained efforts, targeted messaging, and contextual relevance.

Table 11 - Effect sizes from Role of Media and Communication

Outcome Category	Effect size	No. Of studies	No.of Effect sizes
Political Security	0.05	1	4
Civic Participation	0.049	6	13
Nature & scale of atrocity prevention	0.014	1	6
social norms of violence or atrocity prevention	0.014	9	54
Intermediate Social Cohesion Outcome	0.025	6	40

Feelings of trust & Acceptance of diversity	0.015	9	49
Government Performance	0.006	2	14
Willingness to participate or help	0.108	4	19
Access to Justice, right & Public Services	0.148	1	9
Economic Security	-0.013	1	3

3.3 Research, monitoring, and assessments

Peacekeeping operations with a monitoring function show little or no average change in violence outcomes. One study of providing information to the public finds a large increase in willingness to participate politically. Evidence is mixed and overall low confidence.

Research, monitoring, and assessments are defined as any intervention that seeks to provide research, monitoring or assessment activity to develop a new or improved understanding of the drivers and risks underlying existing or possible conflicts or atrocities, with a view to anticipating or managing these risks. They could include research to understand the relative prominence of conflict drivers in a given setting, specific atrocity risk assessments undertaken using tools and frameworks, or monitoring missions to periodically assess risk factors underpinning a possible conflict or atrocity, e.g. fact-finding missions, or understanding the scale of violence present. These activities could draw on the single or multi-use of any form of data collection, such as traditional desk-based methods, survey approaches, analysis of secondary or open source data, or qualitative approaches. Activities could also be undertaken to identify or predict conflicts or atrocities before they commence, i.e. early warning systems, or whilst a conflict or atrocity is underway, escalated or subsided, to understand changes in context or key developments as they arise. In this evidence base, the category includes monitoring as part of peacekeeping operations and related civilian protection activities; monitoring and assessment of mediation, ceasefires, and peace agreement implementation; election-related programming that combines civic education and structured public discussions with community-based security monitoring committees; and ICT-enabled early warning and early response systems that collect, verify, and share incident reports.

Research, monitoring, and assessment interventions aim to reduce conflict and atrocity risks by improving the availability and credibility of information, strengthening accountability, and enabling earlier and more coordinated responses. Monitoring and assessment can support deterrence when information is credible and is linked to actors that can act on it, such as peacekeepers with the capacity to patrol, protect civilians, and respond to threats. In negotiations and peace implementation, monitoring can identify commitment problems, non-compliance, and implementation bottlenecks and can inform

verification arrangements and third-party guarantees. In elections, civic education can reduce misinformation and fear, while security monitoring committees are intended to reduce intimidation and improve confidence in participation. In early warning systems, anonymous reporting and verification aim to reduce fear of retaliation and improve trust in information flows between communities and authorities.

Several findings point to limited or null impacts alongside some benefits. For the nature and scale of violence, pooled estimates drawn largely from studies of peacekeeping operations which include monitoring are very small ($g = 0.02$), consistent with little or no average effect, and estimates vary widely across settings. Importantly, the underlying studies typically assess whole peacekeeping mission packages, where monitoring is not separable from other components such as troop and police deployments, patrols, mandates, and civilian protection activities. The summaries suggest that larger UN troop and police deployments are more consistently associated with reduced civilian fatalities than unarmed observer missions, but these patterns should be interpreted as effects of bundled operations rather than monitoring alone. For diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution, two cross-national studies suggest a moderate average association with improved negotiation and peace agreement implementation ($g = 0.14$), while also documenting constraints that can offset gains, including coordination problems in multi-actor conflicts and power imbalances that weaken implementation. For election-related outcomes in Liberia, one impact evaluation reports a large increase in willingness to participate ($g = 0.25$) and a small improvement in political security ($g = 0.06$), driven more by civic education and town hall components than by community security monitoring committees. The same evaluation reports little or no overall change in civic participation with a slightly negative direction ($g = -0.03$), linked to the security committee component and more fragmented voting patterns. For government performance and for feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity, one qualitative study in Kenya reports improvements linked to an ICT-enabled early warning and early response system.

Confidence in these findings is low overall. Several outcomes rely on a single impact evaluation in one post-conflict setting, limiting generalizability and making estimates sensitive to contextual factors and self-reported measures. Although the peacekeeping evidence includes more studies and effect sizes, conclusions are weakened by heterogeneity and by the fact that monitoring is usually embedded within broader mission packages, which limits attribution to monitoring specifically. For diplomatic relations and peace implementation, the number of studies is small and effects operate through complex pathways where conditions that promote negotiation may still hinder implementation. The early warning system evidence comes from one qualitative study with limited reporting on methods for reducing bias and triangulating reports. Overall, the evidence suggests that any benefits depend heavily on whether monitoring and assessment are linked to credible capacity to respond and whether components inadvertently change incentives in ways that produce adverse outcomes.

Table 12 - Effect sizes for research, monitoring, and assessments outcomes (ordered by effect size)

Outcome	Effect size (Hedges g)	Magnitude classification	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes	Intervention details and nuances
Willingness to participate or help	0.247	Large effect	1	1	Liberia (2011 elections): civic education and town hall meetings plus related program components increased willingness to participate. Community security committee monitoring showed limited or no measurable impacts; combined programming still shows a moderate improvement overall.
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.139	Moderate effect	2	15	Cross-national post-civil war evidence on monitoring and assessment of negotiation dynamics and peace agreement implementation. Average effect is moderate, but pathways are mixed: stalemates may open space for talks while multi-actor settings and power imbalances can still undermine implementation and raise relapse risks.
Political security	0.055	Small effect	1	6	Liberia (2011 elections): civic education improved voter knowledge and reduced fear of retribution; security committee monitoring produced smaller and more limited changes. Average effect is small.
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.022	Little or no effect	9	44	Mostly quantitative studies of peacekeeping operations. Monitoring is embedded within broader mission packages (troops, police, patrols, civilian protection mandates), so effects cannot be separated from other operational components. Pooled effect is little or no average change, with wide heterogeneity (range -0.244 to 0.334). Unarmed observer missions show minimal impacts; regional missions appear more effective against government violence than rebel abuses.

Civic participation	-0.030	Little or no effect	1	3	Liberia (2011 elections): average effect is little or no change but slightly adverse overall. The negative direction is linked to the security committee component and more fragmented voting patterns; civic education and town halls show more favorable patterns for voter coordination.
Government performance		Not estimated (qualitative evidence only)	1	0	Kenya (Northwestern): qualitative study of an ICT-enabled early warning and early response system reports faster information sharing, improved responsiveness of local authorities, and greater accountability. No pooled quantitative effect size was reported.
Feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity		Not estimated (qualitative evidence only)	1	0	Kenya (Northwestern): qualitative study reports improved trust and reciprocity between communities and authorities, and more inclusive participation linked to anonymous reporting and verification. No pooled quantitative effect size was reported.

3.4 Dispute resolution: row summary

Dispute resolution interventions have little or no effect on violence and can adversely affect violence-related norms, despite being associated with improvements in access to justice, physical security, and some measures of trust.

Dispute resolution refers to interventions to handle disputes in community settings through approaches such as mediation, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, traditional councils, and other cultural means of resolving disputes. In the included studies, these approaches included interest-based negotiation training for community leaders and religious leaders, community mediation and dialogue forums, peace committees, interfaith initiatives, legal empowerment and paralegal support, linking customary dispute-resolution systems with formal courts, and community-driven projects such as shared grazing arrangements, gardens, and local infrastructure.

These interventions are intended to reduce conflict by improving the fairness, legitimacy, and effectiveness of local mechanisms for settling disputes before they escalate. Mediation skills training and facilitation aim to shift parties away from coercion toward negotiated solutions, while joint projects and structured dialogue are meant to create incentives for cooperation and rebuild relationships across groups. Legal empowerment and connections between customary and formal systems are intended to widen access to redress, strengthen confidence in justice providers, and reduce grievances that can fuel violence.

Dispute resolution has large positive effects on access to justice and public services ($g = 0.48$; 2 studies, 9 effect sizes), which was driven by programmes that trained mediators, provided legal education, and expanded alternative dispute resolution and legal aid, although gender disparities and power imbalances often persisted. Large average effects were also reported for physical security ($g = 0.29$; 2 studies, 7 effect sizes) in Nigeria, where CONCUR, IPNN, and ECPN combined negotiation training, mediation, and collaborative peacebuilding activities and were associated with improved freedom of movement and perceived safety. In Niger, the PEACE programme showed a large effect on cooperation intensity and willingness to help among direct participants ($g = 0.28$; 1 study, 5 effect sizes), but showed little overall change in civic participation ($g = -0.04$; 1 study, 9 effect sizes) and mixed results by subgroup, with women and youth often constrained by social norms and household responsibilities. There was also a positive effect on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution ($g = 0.21$; 4 studies, 35 effect sizes), with non-coercive strategies such as interest-based negotiation and alternative dispute resolution described as more effective than coercive approaches, which sometimes exacerbated conflict. Trust and acceptance of diversity outcomes showed a moderate average positive effect ($g = 0.13$; 6 studies, 28 effect sizes), but effects varied across contexts, including some evidence that programmes strengthened within-group ties more than between-group trust in more homogeneous communities. In contrast, average effects were little or no for nature and scale of violence ($g = 0.03$; 2 studies, 25 effect sizes) and government performance ($g = 0.03$; 2 studies, 9 effect sizes). For example, a community empowerment programme reduced unresolved disputes in Liberia without reducing wider inter-tribal violence and was associated with increased youth-elder disputes, while UN peacekeeping patrols increased trust in police but were associated with higher perceived government corruption in patrol communities. Economic security showed a small average positive effect ($g = 0.08$; 1 study, 11 effect sizes), reflecting improvements in some measures of economic access in CONCUR sites but no measurable economic impact for IPNN. Violence-related social norms showed a moderate average

adverse effect ($g = -0.13$; 2 studies, 5 effect sizes): interventions reduced justification for violence in some measures but increased support for political violence in others, highlighting the potential for unintended consequences.

Confidence in these findings is generally low. Most outcomes draw on a small number of studies, several of which are context-specific programme evaluations with limited replication, and many measures rely on self-reported perceptions rather than verified behavioural outcomes. Where effect sizes are available, heterogeneity across settings and programme designs is substantial, with different components, target groups, and baseline conflict dynamics producing different results. Qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia and Indonesia highlights that mediation may be viewed as legitimate and useful where mediators are trusted and have authority to enforce agreements, but distrust of state institutions can undermine reforms linked to policing and formal services. Overall, the evidence suggests potential for improved dispute handling and perceptions of security and justice, but uncertainty remains about sustained impacts on violence and about the conditions under which adverse shifts in norms and participation occur.

Table 13 - Average effect sizes for dispute resolution outcomes

Outcome	Average effect size (g)	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Access, Justice, and Public Service	0.479	2	9
Physical Security	0.288	2	7
willingness to participate or help	0.280	1	5
Diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution:	0.207	4	35
the Feeling of Trust & Acceptance of Diversity.	0.133	6	28
Economic Security	0.077	1	11
Nature & scale of violence or atrocity	0.030	2	25
Government Performance	0.030	2	9
civic participation	-0.041	1	9
Social norms regarding Violence or Atrocity	-0.132	2	5

3.5 Social inclusion and reintegration activities: row summary

Social inclusion and reintegration activities have little or no effect across a wide range of social cohesion and related outcomes.

Social inclusion and reintegration activities are interventions with conflict and atrocity prevention aims that support the social inclusion and reintegration of returnees, non-combatants, or displaced populations, excluding the reintegration of ex-combatants which is categorised elsewhere. In practice this includes inclusive community-driven development with explicit inclusion objectives, and group-based community dialogues or reconciliations. Most quantitative evidence in this summary comes from a block grant programme for conflict-affected villages in Aceh, Indonesia (BRA-KDP).

By creating structured opportunities for participation and voice, these interventions aim to make local decision-making more inclusive and legitimate, strengthen accountability, and support collective action around shared priorities. Dialogue components aim to reduce mistrust and improve non-violent problem solving. Together, these pathways may help communities manage tensions and support reintegration after conflict.

Quantitative effects show mostly little or no effect for most outcomes. These effects are mostly statistically insignificant. The study of the BRA-KDP programme in Aceh reported near zero effects for civic participation, government performance, educational security, access to public services, dispute resolution, environmental security, and violence prevention (g values mostly between 0.0 and 0.045). There is also only a small impact on economic security (g = 0.04), despite some reported poverty reduction and gains in asset ownership. Health outcomes show little or no effect with a small negative estimate (g = -0.03). Findings from a systematic review are that social norms regarding violence and rights show consistently little or no effect (g from -0.01 to 0.04), while safety net outcomes vary widely (g = -0.17 to 0.88), with one study reporting large gains in women forming their own organisation but most other proxy measures showing no effect or mixed results. Qualitative evidence suggests local gains in women's representation in governance, and there are also adverse findings such as lower perceived influence over decisions and lower acceptance of ex-combatants among some groups.

Confidence is mostly low because evidence is limited and concentrated in a few programmes and settings, with several outcomes relying on a single quasi-experimental evaluation. The underpinning systematic review is high quality, but for this intervention category it often draws on small numbers of studies and sometimes narrative synthesis rather than pooled effects. Overall, the evidence supports at most modest, local effects, and does not provide a strong basis for general claims about reductions in conflict or atrocity risks.

Table 14 - Effect sizes for social inclusion and reintegration activities (Hedges g)

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Magnitude	Studies (n)	Effect sizes (k)
Presence and quality of social safety nets	-0.17 to 0.88	Range from small negative to large positive	3	Not reported
Feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.056	Small	2	24

Environmental security	0.045	Little or no	1	1
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.042	Little or no	1	1
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	-0.01 to 0.04	Little or no	5	Not reported
Economic security	0.036	Little or no	1	7
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.012	Little or no	1	4
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.007	Little or no	1	8
Civic participation	0.003	Little or no	1	2
Government performance	0.0	Little or no	1	4
Educational security	0.0	Little or no	1	1
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.0 (average reported)	Little or no	3	Not reported
Food security, nutrition and health security	-0.027	Little or no	1	2
Political security	Not reported	Narrative evidence suggests positive local effects	3	Not applicable

CIVIL SOCIETY

4.1 Civil society initiatives

Civil society capacity-building and civic engagement interventions resulted in a large improvement in some government performance outcomes but harmful pooled effects in civic participation and in one case increased ethnic violence.

Civil society initiatives are interventions that develop the capacity of individuals and organizations in civil society and increase civic engagement and empowerment, including strengthening community interest groups and oversight of public institutions. There is variation in the type of intervention in the included studies. They can be classified as (i) civic education and participatory workshops on rights, governance and decentralization; (ii) voter mobilization and election-focused engagement such as town halls and SMS campaigns; (iii) youth-focused secondary education paired with civic engagement and service projects; (iv) anonymous citizen complaint mechanisms intended to improve accountability of public services such as policing; (v) community-based electoral security and violence early-warning systems coordinated with UN peacekeepers; and (vi) poverty alleviation transfers and work-for-relief

grants that financed local infrastructure while also expanding administrative and public security spending.

These initiatives are intended to reduce conflict risks by changing information, incentives and by supporting collective action. Civic education and deliberative forums are expected to increase political knowledge, political efficacy and tolerance, strengthen non-violent norms, and enable citizens to make political choices without intimidation or clientelist pressure. Accountability mechanisms such as complaint boxes are intended to lower the costs and risks of reporting misconduct, deter abuse, and improve responsiveness of authorities, thereby strengthening trust and access to justice. Youth education and civic engagement components aim to expand skills and future opportunities while providing non-violent pathways for participation, reducing the appeal of armed groups. Economic and infrastructure components are expected to reduce grievances by improving livelihoods and service delivery, but programmes can also raise expectations that institutions cannot meet or be used to strengthen administrative control, which may generate dissatisfaction or exacerbate tensions.

Perceptions of government performance showed a large improvement ($g=0.22$; 2 studies, 14 effect sizes) linked to civic education workshops and citizen complaint boxes, but one workshop intervention also reduced satisfaction with democracy, suggesting that increasing knowledge can expose governance failures and widen the gap between citizen expectations and institutional delivery. Intermediate social cohesion outcomes improved moderately ($g=0.19$; 3 studies, 9 effect sizes), reflecting gains in civic competence, political efficacy and participation-related mediators. Physical security in Xinjiang, China improved moderately ($g=0.18$; 1 study, 4 effect sizes) mainly through increased public security and administrative spending, but the evidence noted limited direct improvement in community safety where spending prioritised administration and control. Economic security also improved moderately ($g=0.18$; 2 studies, 8 effect sizes), driven by work-for-relief gains in agricultural production and reduced youth disappointment about livelihood opportunities, while fiscal assistance showed limited direct economic impact and no immediate revenue gains. Willingness to participate was moderately improved in a Liberia election programme ($g=0.15$; 1 study, 3 effect sizes), including higher engagement and a shift away from parochial voting, while a related electoral security component mainly affected vote diversity. Social norms regarding violence showed a moderate reduction in acceptance of political violence ($g=0.10$; 2 studies, 14 effect sizes), with effects that varied by gender and context, and stronger reductions in less violent areas and among women and urban youth in Somalia. Several outcomes showed only small or little to no effects: political security ($g=0.08$; 4 studies, 22 effect sizes), sense of belongingness ($g=0.062$; 1 study, 2 effect sizes) and feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity ($g=0.058$; 2 studies, 4 effect sizes), with qualitative evidence highlighting persistent clan-based or ethnic divisions that limited inclusion. Access to justice, rights and public services showed little or no overall change ($g=0.03$; 1 study, 4 effect sizes), including small declines in perceived local government knowledge and influence alongside improvements in awareness of district budgets and performance information. Two outcomes showed harmful pooled effects: civic participation ($g=-0.281$; 5 studies, 24 effect sizes) and the nature and scale of violence in Xinjiang ($g=-0.088$; 1 study, 2 effect sizes). The civic participation result reflects negative or negligible impacts on national political engagement, decentralization support and institutional trust despite some improvements in local participation and voter coordination. The Xinjiang violence finding suggests that some fiscal transfers correlated with intensified ethnic violence while work-for-relief showed mixed effects. For sexual and gender-based violence, the review evidence reports no demonstrated effect for civic engagement and empowerment programmes, while some economic empowerment interventions

may reduce intimate partner violence when male partners participate. Unintended consequences such as stigma or retaliation against survivors were also reported in some settings.

Overall confidence in these findings is low for most outcomes because the evidence base is small, context-specific and heterogeneous, with many estimates coming from a handful of studies conducted in a limited set of countries and using diverse designs. Many initiatives bundle multiple components, making it difficult to isolate which elements drive observed effects. The direction of effects also depends on implementation quality and local political conditions, including whether civic engagement translates into improved institutional performance or instead raises expectations and contestation without a corresponding increase in accountability. The sexual and gender-based violence evidence comes from two high-confidence systematic reviews but relies on narrative synthesis of a small set of primary studies with limited follow-up, which constrains certainty about size and persistence of effects. Taken together, the current evidence supports cautious conclusions: civil society initiatives can yield meaningful gains in some governance and cohesion-related outcomes, but impacts are uneven and can be null or harmful in other domains.

Table 15 - Effect sizes of Civil society initiatives

Outcome	g	Interpretation (by g)	Direction	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Government performance	0.22	Large effect	Positive	2	14
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.193	Moderate effect	Positive	3	9
Physical security	0.181	Moderate effect	Positive	1	4
Economic security	0.181	Moderate effect	Positive	2	8
Willingness to participate	0.148	Moderate effect	Positive	1	3
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.102	Moderate effect	Positive	2	14

Political security	0.08	Small effect	Positive	4	22
Sense of belongingness	0.062	Small effect	Positive	1	2
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.058	Small effect	Positive	2	4
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.027	Little or no effect	Positive	1	4
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	-0.088	Small effect	Harmful	1	2
Civic participation	-0.281	Large effect	Harmful	5	24
Sexual and gender-based violence		Not reported	No effect reported for civic engagement; mixed for economic empowerment		

4.2 Social Funds, Community-Driven Development and Reconstruction

Social funds, community-driven development (CDD) and reconstruction interventions includes things such as local governance initiatives and infrastructure projects. Programs like NSP, GoBifo, and Tuungane promoted local governance and economic empowerment, while CERP focused on rapid-response reconstruction.

These interventions had no effect on diplomatic relations or peaceful dispute resolution. While NSP initially increased disputes due to block grant competition, this effect faded over time. Similarly, there was no pooled effect on the nature and scale of violence and atrocities—some interventions had effects in reducing violence, others had no impact, and a few increased conflict casualties.

The programs had large effects on access to justice, rights, and public services, significantly improving education, water, and electricity access. However, governance effects were weak, women's

empowerment was limited, and there was no improvement in irrigation, transportation, or health services. Local governance participation increased in some cases, but broader transparency and accountability remained weak.

There was a moderate effect on civic engagement, with increased governance participation, women's inclusion, and electoral engagement, though gains were often temporary. There was a small effect on economic security, with minor increases in income, expenditures, and asset ownership but no effect on long-term employment or productivity. There was also a small effect on educational security, improving infrastructure but failing to enhance learning outcomes, school attendance, or institutional accountability.

These interventions have no positive effect on environmental security, with some irrigation and land-use projects leading to unintended degradation. Security perceptions improved slightly, but actual violence and insurgent activity were not reduced.

Overall, while these interventions had large effects on public services and small effects on economic and educational security, their long-term impact on governance, security, and stability remained limited. Sustainable outcomes depended on institutional stability, community involvement, and governance engagement.

Table 16 - Effect sizes from Social funds, community-driven development and reconstruction

Outcome Category	Effect Size	No. of studies	No of Effect size
diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	0.004	1	2
nature and scale of violence and atrocities	-0.005	8	27
social norms regarding violence and atrocities	-0.001	2	6
feelings of trust & acceptance of diversity	0.037	10	40
sense of belongingness	0.0464	1	1
willingness to participate or help	0.167	11	38
access to justice, rights and public services	0.28	6	30
civic participation	0.171	7	28
government performance	0.043	8	147
economic security	0.028	11	57
educational security	0.07	6	23

food security and nutrition and health security	0.08	8	22
physical security	0.031	3	13
political security	0.028	5	21
economic security	0	1	2
intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.095	2	35

GOVERNANCE AND JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS

5.1 Foundational state design processes, transitional political processes, and election support

Support to building state structures and elections has large positive effects on political rights and civil liberties but small harmful effects on government performance and on violence outcomes.

Foundational state design processes includes:

- efforts to support the design and drafting of legal and institutional arrangements for state institutional design such as drawing boundaries, decentralisation, federalism, or dividing territory into districts;
- support to temporary governments during political transitions; and
- election support that helps enable trusted elections and provides information about election processes and candidates.

Across the included studies, this spans UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions with democracy promotion mandates, constitution drafting and public participation processes, decentralisation reforms and local government institutions, participatory selection of local leaders such as clan chiefs, anti-fraud and citizen social monitoring initiatives during elections, election education and voter information delivered through radio and community events, anti-electoral violence campaigns using town meetings and popular theatre, international election observation, electoral system design changes, and related transitional justice or traditional justice processes.

These interventions aim to reduce conflict and atrocities by increasing the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the political process and political settlements, improving the credibility of elections, and strengthening institutions that manage disputes and deliver public services. Mechanisms include reducing manipulation and intimidation through monitoring and anti-fraud measures, lowering fear of electoral violence through collective action messaging and peace education, increasing political knowledge through voter education, and supporting democratic rules and oversight through constitution building, electoral administration support, and peacekeeping missions that combine security assistance with institution building. Several studies also highlight plausible pathways to adverse effects, including decentralisation or resource transfers increasing competition for local office or rents, election observation shifting incentives from government violence to opposition violence in some contexts, and

participatory local leader selection reducing leaders' authority to enforce cooperation, which can weaken collective action for local public goods.

Quantitative syntheses indicate a large positive effect on political rights and civil liberties within access to justice, rights and public services ($g = 0.35$; one study of UN peacebuilding missions). Moderate positive effects are reported for political security ($g = 0.17$), transition of power ($g = 0.14$), physical security ($g = 0.14$), and civic participation ($g = 0.10$), driven mainly by election education, peacekeeping election education events, and anti-violence campaigning. However, pooled estimates suggest small harmful effects on actual and perceived government performance ($g = -0.10$) and on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities ($g = -0.05$), with wide variation across contexts and interventions. For example, some anti-fraud and civic monitoring interventions reduced fraud and improved perceptions of government legitimacy in Afghanistan, while decentralisation reforms and local government institutions were associated with increased insurgency or violence in parts of India and Colombia. There are little or no effect on social norms regarding violence and atrocities ($g = 0.03$), willingness to participate or help ($g = -0.03$), and economic security ($g = 0.0$).

Evidence from qualitative studies reports that UN led multilateral transition support in Mozambique improved educational security and food, nutrition and health security through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, humanitarian assistance, and budget support; findings on feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity are positive but contingent on perceived institutional inclusiveness and material benefits such as land titling, while a study of Syria attributes no effect on sense of belonging to ineffective state design and political processes; and qualitative studies on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution report no clear effect, emphasising persistent constraints from weak implementation, parallel formal and informal systems, and illiberal governance strategies.

Overall confidence is low across outcomes because most evidence comes from quasi experimental designs, the number of studies per outcome is often small, intervention packages differ substantially, and effects are context dependent. It is not possible to separate out the effects of foundational state activities from other activities in multi-component interventions such as peace keeping operations. Several studies have incomplete reporting on attrition or intervention components, limiting confidence in causal attribution and transportability. Where stronger designs exist, such as randomised evaluations of radio based election education and anti-violence campaigning, effects tend to be modest on many indicators and are not uniformly statistically significant, reinforcing the conclusion that expected benefits are not guaranteed and that adverse effects are plausible.

Table 17 - Effect sizes for foundational state design processes, transitional political processes, and election support (ordered by effect size).

Outcome	g	Magnitude	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes	Confidence
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.351	Large effect	1	4	Low
Political security	0.165	Moderate effect	2	15	Low

Outcome	g	Magnitude	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes	Confidence
Transition of power	0.138	Moderate effect	2	6	Low
Physical security	0.137	Moderate effect	2	2	Low
Civic participation	0.103	Moderate effect	3	23	Low
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.032	Little or no effect	2	5	Low
Economic security	0.000	Little or no effect	2	2	Low
Willingness to participate or help	-0.029	Little or no effect	1	2	Low
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	-0.055	Small effect	11	52	Low
Government performance	-0.095	Small effect	4	23	Low

5.2 Transitional or restorative justice and justice system support and reform: row summary

There are large improvements in political security, government performance and sense of belonging from transitional or restorative justice and justice system support and reform. But several outcomes show little or no change or harmful effects.

Transitional or restorative justice refers to efforts to convene meetings between victims and perpetrators of historic or current conflict to prevent further violence, which can lead to formal acknowledgement, apologies, and agreements to repair harms. Justice system support and reform refers to efforts to improve rule of law through stronger courts and more equitable access, including integrating human rights into legal frameworks, building capacity for courts and lawyers, and reforming criminal and penal codes to strengthen equal protection. In the included studies, interventions ranged from national or subnational truth and reconciliation style processes and victim perpetrator dialogue forums, to community-based accountability mechanisms such as Rwanda's Gacaca courts, to post conflict justice and peace processes in Colombia, alongside programs aimed at strengthening courts, legal procedures, and access to justice.

These interventions are intended to reduce conflict drivers by addressing legacies of abuse and impunity, increasing accountability and recognition of harms, and supporting repair through reparations or other remedies. Restorative processes may improve social relationships by enabling

acknowledgement, apology, and reintegration, which can increase sense of belonging and reduce support for violence. Justice system reforms aim to increase the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of state institutions, improve fair dispute resolution, and protect rights, which can improve access to justice and so reduce grievances and increase compliance with laws, potentially improving security and government performance.

Effects vary greatly by outcome, but notably with small adverse effects on trust and violence. In summary:

- There are large effects for some outcomes: political security ($g = 27.38$; 1 study, 5 effect sizes) and government performance ($g = 2.87$; 3 studies, 38 effect sizes), but these estimates are outliers relative to other outcomes and are supported by low confidence evidence, suggesting results may be highly context specific or sensitive to outcome measurement.
- Sense of belonging also showed a large positive effect ($g = 0.90$; 3 studies, 8 effect sizes) and justice outcomes showed a moderate positive effect ($g = 0.17$; 3 studies, 7 effect sizes).
- Small positive effects were reported for willingness to participate ($g = 0.10$; 1 study, 2 effect sizes), transitions of power ($g = 0.07$; 2 studies, 11 effect sizes), and intermediate social cohesion ($g = 0.07$; 5 studies, 18 effect sizes).
- But several outcomes showed little or no effect, including access to justice ($g = 0.01$; 3 studies, 16 effect sizes), nature and scale of violence ($g = 0.02$; 2 studies, 7 effect sizes), diplomatic relations ($g = -0.04$; 3 studies, 30 effect sizes), and food security ($g = -0.05$; 3 studies, 8 effect sizes).
- And there are adverse effects for several important outcomes were reported for civic participation ($g = -0.66$; 3 studies, 13 effect sizes), feelings of trust ($g = -0.40$; 7 studies, 20 effect sizes), social norms regarding violence ($g = -0.25$; 7 studies, 26 effect sizes), and economic security ($g = -0.07$; 2 studies, 13 effect sizes). Qualitative evidence on physical security found no clear effect: one Colombia focused justice and peace process improved law and order but did not address systemic issues such as impunity, judicial inefficiency, and protection of human rights (2 studies, low confidence).

Overall confidence in the findings is low. Most outcomes are based on small numbers of studies, many using observational or case study designs, and several syntheses pool heterogeneous contexts and intervention models. Only the access to justice synthesis was rated medium confidence, while all other quantitative outcomes were rated low confidence and the qualitative physical security evidence was also low confidence. The presence of very large estimates for some outcomes, alongside harmful or null findings for others, underscores uncertainty about generalisability and the importance of context, implementation quality, sequencing with broader political and security reforms, and potential backlash effects. More rigorous and transparent impact evaluations, including careful measurement and reporting of unintended harms, would increase certainty about when these interventions improve peace related outcomes and when they do not.

Table 18 - Effect sizes for transitional or restorative justice and justice system support and reform outcomes

Outcome	g (Hedges g)	Effect size category	Studies	Effect sizes	Notes
Political Security	27.38	Large effect	1	5	
Government Performance	2.87	Large effect	3	38	
Sense Of Belonging	0.90	Large effect	3	8	
Justice	0.17	Moderate effect	3	7	
Willingness To Participate	0.10	Small effect	1	2	
Transitions Of Power	0.07	Small effect	2	11	
Intermediate Social Cohesion	0.07	Small effect	5	18	
Nature And Scale Of Violence	0.02	Little or no effect	2	7	
Access To Justice	0.01	Little or no effect	3	16	
Diplomatic Relations	-0.04	Little or no effect	3	30	
Food Security	-0.05	Little or no effect	3	8	
Economic Security	-0.07	Small effect	2	13	
Social Norms Regarding Violence	-0.25	Large effect	7	26	
Feelings Of Trust	-0.40	Large effect	7	20	

Civic Participation	-0.66	Large effect	3	13	
Physical Security		Qualitative only	2		Qualitative synthesis only

5.3 Power-sharing: row summary

Power-sharing has a small positive effect on government performance, but may have an adverse effect on violence

Power-sharing is any attempt to guarantee the participation of representatives of significant groups in political decision making in order to reduce the danger that one group will become dominant as a new governmental process is specified. This includes power-sharing among groups previously in violent conflict, but also marginalised groups. In the included studies, power-sharing took forms such as ethnic or group quotas, proportional representation rules, guaranteed positions in executive coalitions, institutionalized veto rights, and consociational or other arrangements that allocate political authority among identity-based groups. Two broad designs recur: corporate power-sharing that relies on rigid group-based quotas and liberal power-sharing that uses more flexible, electorally determined inclusion.

Power-sharing aims to reduce incentives for violence and improve governance by assuring major groups that they will participate in decision-making, lowering fears of exclusion, and creating institutions that require bargaining and compromise. In principle, inclusive executive coalitions and proportional representation can limit domination by a single group, improve the credibility of political commitments, and stabilize politics. At the same time, rigid group-based rules can reduce electoral accountability, entrench elites, and harden identity divisions, which may undermine long-term performance or increase political unrest in some settings.

Evidence from two quasi-experimental studies finds a small positive average effect ($g = 0.09$) on government performance. Effects vary by design: liberal forms of power-sharing show clearer positive associations with democratic outcomes, while corporate forms show mixed findings and can trade short-term stability for risks of elite entrenchment and reduced competition. Qualitative synthesis of sixteen studies with a governance component finds that power-sharing does not consistently reduce violence. Reported findings include null effects and adverse associations in ethnically fragmented contexts, including higher levels of political unrest and ethnic violence when arrangements concentrate benefits among political elites, exclude grassroots voices, or institutionalize identity-based divisions.

Confidence in findings low overall. The quantitative evidence for government performance draws on only two studies and both are rated low confidence. Evidence on violence is based on narrative synthesis of a heterogeneous set of studies, with few clear causal estimates and mixed direction of effects across contexts. Taken together, the evidence supports cautious expectations: small average improvements in government performance are possible in some designs, but violence reduction is not reliable and adverse effects are plausible, especially where inclusion is narrow or identity divisions are reinforced.

Table 19 - Summary of effect sizes of power sharing

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Effect magnitude	Direction	Studies (n)	Effect sizes (k)
Government performance	0.09	Small effect	Positive	2	13
Nature and scale of violence	NA	Not reported	Mixed, often null or adverse	16	0

5.4 Public sector provision, governance and institutionalization: row summary

Evidence is mixed. Average effects are usually little or no effect, with a moderate harmful effect on willingness to participate in one Zimbabwe study, and moderate positive effects on economic security and norms opposing violence in a small number of single study settings.

Public sector provision, governance and institutionalisation interventions work with public institutions at national, subnational and local levels. Included studies cover:

- (1) local governance reform through training village heads on rules and conflict management, sometimes adding a civil society leader to create horizontal oversight;
- (2) state building packages in conflict affected areas that combine service delivery, peacebuilding and information provision, such as aid delivered through councils, citizen feedback and SMS information on projects;
- (3) post conflict recovery financing and programming, including Peace Building Fund support in Burundi focused on negotiations, elections, displacement and land dispute resolution;
- (4) integrated security and development strategies such as security only, sequential security then development, and simultaneous approaches, plus redistricting and donor aid coordination; and
- (5) education centred programmes intended to reduce recruitment into violence, including secondary school construction in Somalia and alternative basic education in Uganda.

Several of these are bundled programmes where public sector provision is one component of a wider package.

These interventions aim to improve state legitimacy and reduce conflict drivers by increasing accountability, transparency and procedural compliance, reducing bias and corruption, and improving equitable access to services and dispute resolution. Information interventions aim to shift perceptions and behaviours by increasing awareness of government priorities and enabling feedback. Post conflict and multilateral packages aim to stabilise politics through disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, humanitarian support, electoral assistance and budget support, which may reduce grievances and opportunities for armed mobilisation. Security first and sequencing strategies aim to reduce violence by establishing order before, or alongside, development and reconstruction. Education

programmes are expected to provide alternatives to armed involvement and strengthen social norms that oppose violence.

There are moderate positive effects on economic security and social norms regarding violence and atrocities, but effect sizes for most outcomes are small and sometimes negative. Findings are context specific, and several come from bundled interventions so it is not possible to isolate the contribution of public sector provision alone.

- **Economic security:** $g = 0.17$ (moderate effect) in Burundi. This estimate comes from Peace Building Fund programming that bundled political negotiations, election support, reintegration and livelihoods, so it cannot be attributed to any single component.
- **Social norms regarding violence and atrocities:** $g = 0.11$ (moderate effect) in Somalia. The Somali Youth Learners Initiative combined secondary education expansion with leadership, conflict resolution and civic engagement activities, and the estimate reflects the full programme.
- **Government performance:** $g = 0.10$ (moderate effect) across five studies in multiple countries. Effects varied by intervention type and context: governance training showed small improvements in procedure adherence, while aid and SMS information produced minor and sometimes weaker effects in contested areas.
- **Access to justice, rights and public services:** $g = 0.06$ (small effect) in Zimbabwe. Training that added a civil society leader to village head training improved dispute management and reduced political bias in some service decisions compared with training village heads alone.
- **Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution:** $g = 0.04$ (little or no effect) in Burundi. Peace Building Fund work on displacement reintegration and land dispute mediation showed only very small average change, and the programme was bundled.
- **Food security and nutrition and health security:** $g = 0.04$ (little or no effect) in the Philippines. Peace and Development Teams combined security presence with development activities and reported a very small reduction in child malnutrition.
- **Nature and scale of violence or atrocities:** $g = 0.02$ (little or no effect) across five studies. Average effects were close to zero, but there was substantial variation: some approaches such as security only or sequential strategies were reported as more effective than simultaneous approaches, and redistricting and aid coordination effects differed by local political conditions.
- **Civic participation:** $g = -0.01$ (little or no effect, slightly harmful) in Zimbabwe. The average effect on legitimacy and participation was marginally negative; adding a civil society leader to training partially mitigated negative perceptions.
- **Willingness to participate or help:** $g = -0.13$ (moderate harmful effect) in Zimbabwe. The intervention reduced reported willingness to participate or help, including community leader involvement in distributing food aid, with limited evidence on why this occurred.
- **Educational and political security:** Both of these outcomes have positive qualitative findings in Mozambique linked to a United Nations package including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, humanitarian assistance, political and electoral support and budget support. Effects are bundled and confidence is low.
- **Physical security:** Positive qualitative findings in Uganda for Alternative Basic Education Karamoja, described as reducing incentives for child involvement in cattle raiding and armed groups through flexible, culturally adapted schooling.

Overall confidence is low. Many outcomes rely on one study, sometimes with many effect sizes from the same programme, and several findings come from complex packages that bundle multiple components, limiting causal attribution. There is also meaningful heterogeneity by conflict context, local politics and implementation approach, particularly for violence outcomes and for aid and information interventions. Outcome measures are often perception based and follow up periods are limited. Future evidence would be strengthened by clearer intervention descriptions, longer follow up, and designs that separate service provision from accompanying security, political or peacebuilding components.

Table 20 - Effect sizes reported for public sector provision, governance and institutionalisation interventions

Outcome	Effect size g	Effect category	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Economic security	0.17	Moderate effect	1	34
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.11	Moderate effect	1	12
Government performance	0.10	Moderate effect	5	20
Access to justice, rights and public services	0.06	Small effect	1	12
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.04	Little or no effect	1	38
Food security and nutrition and health security	0.04	Little or no effect	1	1
Intermediate social cohesion	0.04	Little or no effect	1	2
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.02	Little or no effect	5	18
Feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.00	Little or no effect	2	70
Civic participation	-0.01	Little or no effect (slightly harmful)	1	12
Willingness to participate or help	-0.13	Moderate harmful effect	1	2
Educational security	Not reported	Not reported (qualitative)	1	Not reported

Physical security	Not reported	Not reported 1 (qualitative)	Not reported
Political security	Not reported	Not reported 1 (qualitative)	Not reported

5.5 Security sector reform interventions: row summary

Security sector reform – notably the transition to from international to local security forces - show a small effect on violence and perceived security. There is also improved peaceful resolution, though the effect is also small.

Security sector reform aims to improve how governments provide safety, security, and justice through actors such as police, military forces, customs, and correctional services, as well as oversight bodies.

In the included studies in this row, interventions fell into three main types. First, peace operation and stabilization strategies that sequence security and development tasks, including security only approaches, sequential approaches, and simultaneous approaches. Second, security transition reforms that transfer security provision from international forces to local forces, specifically the handover from the International Security Assistance Force to the Afghan National Security Forces in Afghanistan. Third, community level reforms that seek to replace or prevent a return to rebel governance by improving coordination between state and communal authorities, exemplified by Colombia's ComunPaz program, which worked with police, Police Inspectors, and local community action bodies.

These interventions are expected to work by increasing the capability and legitimacy of state security providers, strengthening oversight and coordination, and reducing the opportunity for armed groups to govern or use violence. Peace operation strategies that prioritize establishing order may reduce conflict recurrence by limiting insurgent capacity and giving state institutions time to consolidate. Transitions from international forces to local forces may improve perceptions of security and legitimacy when communities see local forces present and effective, but they can also fail if local capacity or impartiality is weak. Programs like ComunPaz aim to improve everyday justice and dispute resolution by clarifying roles, building trust through structured interaction, and creating practical coordination routes between state authorities and local community institutions.

The evidence base includes six studies overall, with three impact evaluations contributing effect sizes for violence and atrocity outcomes, one impact evaluation for perceived physical security, and one randomized trial for dispute resolution outcomes.

Reported pooled effects are generally small or very small, and some outcomes show null results. Where interventions were implemented as a package, it is not always possible to attribute impacts to a single reform component.

- Nature and scale of violence or atrocities: $g = 0.05$ (Small effect); 3 studies, 22 effect sizes. Across peace operation strategy comparisons and two country studies, pooled impacts suggest a small average reduction in violence related outcomes. Security only and sequential strategies were more successful at conflict termination and sustaining peace than simultaneous strategies

in the non experimental comparison. In Colombia, ComunPaz reduced unresolved and violent disputes at the community level, while household level outcomes and resident reports showed little change and some estimates were not statistically significant. In Afghanistan, violence intensity was estimated to decline by around ten percent after Afghan forces assumed responsibility, but this transition occurred alongside other changes, including the broader drawdown of international forces.

- Physical security perceptions: $g = 0.01$ (Little or no effect); 1 study, 13 effect sizes. In Afghanistan, the transfer of control from international forces to Afghan forces was associated with modest improvements in perceived security and perceived legitimacy of Afghan forces. The average effect is very small, and ongoing risks such as limited local capacity and Taliban influence were interpreted to mean that perceived improvements may not translate into sustained security gains.
- Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution: $g = 0.02$ (Little or no effect); 1 study, 5 effect sizes. ComunPaz produced a very small average improvement in consensus around dispute resolution and understanding of local authority, and the evaluation found no clear change in agreement on major disputes between treatment and control groups. Some leader reported indicators suggested improved coordination between state and communal authorities, but these improvements did not consistently translate into broader community wide consensus.
- Qualitative and review evidence (no pooled effect size): Two qualitative studies and one systematic review provide contextual insights. The systematic review of studies on security and policing practices in urban violence reported mixed findings, including that some public security platforms and heavy handed policing approaches were associated with reductions in violence in the included studies, but the underlying studies were described as low quality and results were not consistent across contexts.

Overall confidence is low. Effect estimates come from a small number of studies, often from single country settings, with limited ability to separate the effects of specific reform components from other concurrent changes, such as broader military drawdowns or complementary governance activities. Several studies were rated low confidence due to limitations such as incomplete outcome reporting, missing information on attrition, and non experimental designs. Findings also vary by strategy and level of analysis, for example community level dispute reductions without corresponding household level change, suggesting that impacts may be context dependent and may not generalize across settings or across different reform designs.

Table 21 - Reported effect sizes (Hedges g) of Security sector reform interventions

Outcome	Effect size g	Magnitude	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.05	Small effect	3	22
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.02	Little or no effect	1	5
Physical security perceptions	0.01	Little or no effect	1	13

Qualitative studies on security sector reform and violence outcomes	Not reported	2	0
Systematic review of security and policing practices and urban violence	Not reported	1	0

SOCIO- ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

6.1 Training and Job Creation

Training and job creation interventions, such as vocational training, business mentorship, and financial assistance, are assessed in 27 impact evaluation studies. The evidence shows that these interventions improve economic security by increasing employment rates and stabilizing income. They also show additional social benefits including improved psychosocial well-being, fostering trust and acceptance of diversity, and improving physical security. However, they have limited effects on food security and willingness to help and may have an adverse impact on educational outcomes.

These interventions have a large pooled effect on social cohesion by integrating economic opportunities with psychosocial support. Programs like INVEST in Afghanistan and L.A.C.E.S. in Liberia show that vocational training alone has limited effects on self-efficacy, while sport-based programs improve social responsibility and a sense of purpose. The interventions also have a significant effect on trust and acceptance of diversity outcomes. Vocational training and business mentorship programs promote economic stability and social cohesion. In Uganda, inclusive refugee policies increased support for refugee rights, while in Somalia, employment programs promoted cohesion across clans and genders. However, in South Sudan, unmet expectations from a cash grant program eroded trust, and in Mozambique, economic training worsened perceptions of aggression.

The interventions have a moderate pooled effect on economic security, physical security, and a sense of belonging. Evidence from 15 impact evaluation studies suggests these interventions generally increase employment rates, stabilize incomes, and reduce reliance on illegal work. Notable examples include Liberia's agricultural training program, which led to 77% engagement in farming, and Tanzania's RukaJuu! initiative, where entrepreneurship training increased earnings by 146%. Public works programs, such as India's NREGA, successfully stabilized incomes during economic shocks. However, their effects were mixed in fragile and gender-unequal settings where access to decent work remained limited. One systematic review found that technical and vocational training improved women entrepreneurs' capacities and access to assets, credit, and income. Employment programs also have a moderate effect on physical security by reducing fear of crime and promoting stability, particularly in African countries. In Burundi, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, and Uganda, job programs in vulnerable areas aimed to deter criminal activity and foster social cohesion. A pseudo-meta-analysis using a difference-in-differences (DID) approach found that these programs consistently lowered fear of crime, suggesting a positive effect on perceived security. The interventions have a small pooled effect on shifting social norms regarding violence and atrocities. While job training can reduce support for violence by improving economic security and social cohesion, its effectiveness in changing attitudes toward violence varies.

Some programs decrease justification for violence, while others show limited or no impact. Some positive associations were found between willingness to help and connectedness. Studies in Liberia and Afghanistan show mixed results: in Liberia, participants were less likely to engage with armed recruiters but showed no increase in civic participation, while in Afghanistan, positive effects were found on social connectedness, particularly across tribal lines.

Training and job creation programs have small effects on perceptions of government performance. While some initiatives improve trust in government, others have no effect or even reduce institutional confidence. Programs such as the ILO's Youth Employment Somalia (YES) and Youth for Change (Y4C) initiatives, along with employment programs in Burundi, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, and Uganda (Africa), show that while economic stability improves, governance perceptions remain varied.

The interventions have no pooled effect on the nature and scale of violence or atrocities. While some programs, such as cash-for-work initiatives and guaranteed employment schemes, reduce conflict intensity and improve stability, their effectiveness depends on governance capacity, security conditions, and economic factors. In Iraq, the ICRRP reduced grave violations against children, while India's NREGS significantly lowered Maoist conflict violence. However, in some cases, job creation efforts correlated with increased state-led counterinsurgency operations, leading to temporary rises in violence.

Some adverse effects were also observed. Evidence from Mozambique shows that employment training reduced political interest among young Muslim men, suggesting that such programs may, in some contexts, disengage certain groups from political life. However, other studies—particularly a systematic review of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) programs—found moderate improvements in women's political participation and representation. This suggests that while training programs can empower women to take on greater roles in decision-making, their impact on broader political interest may vary across contexts and groups. Additionally, labor-intensive public works programs led to increased school absenteeism, reflecting trade-offs between short-term employment and educational security. The Sierra Leone Cash-for-Work (CfW) program improved economic outcomes but diverted time from education, showing no long-term employment or skill development benefits.

Overall, evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America, and global studies underscores that while training and job creation programs enhance economic security and stability, their impacts on social cohesion and governance remain limited, there is no effect on reducing violence and atrocities, and they can have adverse effects on educational and political security.

Table 22 - Effect of training & job creation:

Outcome Sub-domain	Effect size	No. of Studies	No. of effect sizes
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	0.1	6	41
Willingness to participate or help	0.064	2	3
Government performance	0.051	5	29
Food security and nutrition & health security	0.036	3	6
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.01	7	41
Economic security	0.188	15	190
Physical security	0.154	1	1
Sense of belonging	0.114	2	13
Intermediate social cohesion	0.26	3	40
Feelings of trust & Acceptance of diversity	0.239	5	43
Political security	-0.577	1	1
Educational security	-0.027	1	2

6.2 Financial products and services and Cash and in-kind transfers: row summary

Financial products and cash or in kind transfers show mostly small and mixed effects on conflict and atrocity related outcomes, with some moderate gains for social cohesion and human security outcomes, and small harms for a few governance and political outcomes.

These interventions provide financial capital or material support to individuals, households, or groups in fragile and conflict affected settings.

The evidence in the included studies covers: group based finance such as self help groups and village savings and loan associations; institutional microfinance delivered through banks, post offices, or similar providers; and transfers that provide cash, vouchers, or goods. Transfer programmes include unconditional cash transfers, conditional cash transfers linked to schooling, food assistance delivered directly to communities, cash for work, and one off grants for business start up. Many programmes

bundle transfers with other components such as vocational training, business skills training, mentorship, health insurance, nutrition education, or cognitive behavioral therapy.

The core theory of change is that easing economic constraints reduces incentives to engage in violence, lowers stress, and enables investment in safer livelihoods. Transfers can raise the opportunity costs of joining armed groups and help households avoid harmful coping strategies such as child labor. Group based finance may also strengthen informal social networks and mutual support, which can improve safety nets and intermediate social cohesion. Bundled programmes aim to translate short term relief into longer term gains through skills, mentoring, or psychosocial support, and some interventions explicitly link benefits to state or aid sharing policies to strengthen inclusion. However, the same pathways can generate risks if programmes are perceived as clientelist, if delivery raises unmet expectations, or if aid changes local bargaining incentives in ways that worsen tensions.

Evidence of effects is mixed across outcomes and intervention designs. The largest effects are on safety nets, and with positive effects also on health and education (health and education). A detailed overview is as follows:

- Social safety nets and intermediate cohesion: Group based finance has a moderate positive association with measures such as women's freedom of movement and association ($g = 0.18$). Institutional microfinance shows a large effect in one study ($g = 0.53$). By contrast, cash transfers show little or no effect on safety net outcomes ($g = 0.01$), and the transfer studies were bundled with training so the independent effect of cash cannot be isolated.
- Human security: Effects are generally small to moderate for economic security ($g = 0.10$) and education security ($g = 0.11$). Food security, nutrition, and health security show a small positive average ($g = 0.11$). Several studies indicate that benefits can be short lived when transfers are one off, and disrupted programmes can have adverse psychological and trust effects for those expecting support that does not arrive.
- Social cohesion and participation: Trust and acceptance of diversity ($g = 0.05$) and willingness to participate or to help ($g = 0.05$) show small positive averages, while civic participation shows a small effect that is close to the no effect threshold ($g = 0.06$). Some studies report initial improvements that fade over time, and short term employment programmes can temporarily reduce trust before later gains emerge.
- Violence and atrocity outcomes: Average effects on the nature and scale of violence ($g = 0.01$) and on social norms regarding violence ($g = 0.01$) are little or no effect. Individual studies report important variation, including localized violence reductions under conditional programmes and potential harms such as increased insurgent violence or targeting in some contexts, suggesting that design and conflict dynamics matter.
- Governance and politics: Government performance shows a small harmful average ($g = -0.03$), and physical security also shows a small harmful average ($g = -0.03$). Political security shows a moderate harmful effect ($g = -0.13$) driven by increased perceived legitimacy of political violence following a girls' scholarship programme. Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution also shows a small harmful average ($g = -0.07$) in evidence on post conflict aid that shifts incentives after decisive military victories.

Confidence in findings is mostly low. Many cells draw on few studies, and several primary studies are rated low confidence, limiting certainty even where patterns appear consistent. Effects vary by modality and by whether the intervention is bundled with training, mentoring, or psychosocial support, which

makes it difficult to attribute impacts to cash or financial products alone. Context also appears important, with different results in refugee hosting settings, active conflict zones, and post conflict environments. Confidence is relatively higher where evidence is larger and includes multiple stronger designs, such as food security and related outcomes, but even there results depend on implementation quality and follow up periods.

Table 23 - Effect sizes of Financial products and services

Outcome	Intervention type	g	Effect size category	Studies (n)	Effect sizes (n)
Presence and quality of social safety nets	Institutional microfinance	0.53	Large effect	1	Not reported
Presence and quality of social safety nets	Group finance (self help groups and village savings and loan associations)	0.18	Moderate effect	7	Not reported
Sense of belonging	Cash grant plus information about refugee aid sharing policy	0.11	Moderate effect	1	10
Food security and nutrition and Health security	Cash and in kind transfers and related financial support	0.11	Moderate effect	5	61
Education security	Merit scholarship and winter cash assistance	0.11	Moderate effect	2	8
Economic security	Cash transfers, grants, and bundled skills or behavioral support	0.10	Moderate effect	6	162
Civic participation	Financial products and cash or in kind transfers	0.06	Small effect	2	9
Feelings of trust and Acceptance of diversity	Cash and in kind transfers and financial products	0.05	Small effect	7	101

Willingness to participate or to help	Cash grants, cash for work, and transfers	0.05	Small effect	3	20
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	Cash transfers, subsidies, and humanitarian aid	0.01	Little or no effect	7	28
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	Cash and in kind transfers, often bundled with training or therapy	0.01	Little or no effect	7	66
Presence and quality of social safety nets	Cash transfers (all bundled with training)	0.01	Little or no effect	3	Not reported
Government performance	Cash and in kind transfers and financial products	-0.03	Little or no effect	4	46
Physical security	Cash transfers and related financial support	-0.03	Little or no effect	2	5
Diplomatic relations and Peaceful dispute resolution	Humanitarian aid (cash and in kind transfers)	-0.07	Small effect	1	2
Political security	Merit based scholarship (cash transfer incentive)	-0.13	Moderate effect	1	1
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	Cash transfer with or without vocational training	No effect size	Not applicable	1	No effect size
Multiple outcomes	Qualitative evidence (Mozambique post war transition)	No effect size	Not applicable	1	No effect size

6.3 Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) – row summary

Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) shows large improvements in trauma-related health outcomes and (in one study) social cohesion. But there are little or no effects on violence outcomes and broader social norms.

MHPSS interventions in this evidence base provide structured psychological and social support to people affected by conflict, including survivors of violence, refugees, and current or former combatants.

The included studies cover: (i) individual trauma therapies, especially Narrative Exposure Therapy and forensic adaptations for offenders (NET and FORNET) in DRC; (ii) cognitive and socio-behavioral therapies designed to build self-control and a non-criminal identity (Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and the STYL program in Liberia); (iii) community-based healing and reconciliation approaches that combine psychoeducation with facilitated group dialogue (HCUP in Rwanda); (iv) school-based psychosocial and conflict resolution programming (School Mediation Intervention in Gaza); and (v) survivor support and case management, sometimes bundled with community mobilisation to increase awareness of sexual and gender-based violence services (review evidence from refugee and humanitarian settings in Kenya and Lebanon). In some settings, MHPSS is bundled with economic support (cash grants) or embedded within wider community programming.

These interventions are intended to reduce inter-group violence and strengthen social functioning by addressing conflict-related trauma and its behavioral sequelae. At the individual level, trauma processing and skills-based therapy aim to reduce PTSD symptoms, shame, depression, and appetitive aggression, while improving emotional regulation, impulse control, and future planning. Several programs explicitly target harmful beliefs and social norms, for example rape myth acceptance and stigma toward sexual violence survivors, through facilitated discussion and community engagement. The downstream pathway to violence prevention is typically indirect: improved mental health and self-control are expected to reduce reactive aggression and antisocial behavior, support reintegration into civilian life, and increase participation in prosocial networks and livelihoods. The bundling of MHPSS in some cases makes it difficult to isolate the marginal contribution of psychological components.

Evidence of effects (Hedges g ; two decimal places):

- **Intermediate social cohesion outcomes:** Large positive effects in one Rwanda study (HCUP) on trauma reduction and reconciliation ($g = 0.58$). Effects differed by participant group and program focus (for example secular versus religious and community-focused groups), suggesting sensitivity to local implementation and social context.
- **Food security and nutrition; health security:** Large average improvements in trauma-related health outcomes ($g = 0.26$) across multiple studies and contexts (DRC, Liberia, Rwanda, Gaza). However, effects were not uniformly positive: the school mediation program in Gaza stabilised distress and depression but was associated with increased PTSD symptoms for some children, indicating potential adverse effects for highly traumatised participants.
- **Nature and scale of violence or atrocities:** A very small overall reduction in violent behavior and related outcomes ($g = 0.03$). In Liberia, CBT and STYL were tested both alone and bundled with cash; direct effects on several self-reported criminal and conflict behaviors were not statistically significant, and some intimate partner violence indicators were mixed over time. In Eastern DRC, NETfacts did not show direct effects on victimisation or perpetration, but indirect

reductions were observed through decreased rape myth acceptance (a plausible mediating mechanism).

- **Economic security:** A very small improvement in economic reintegration ($g = 0.03$). In DRC, FORNET was associated with better economic reintegration in later dissemination and longer follow-up periods, suggesting learning and delivery quality may matter. In Liberia, short-term economic gains were largely driven by cash grants; when therapy and cash were bundled, the specific contribution of MHPSS cannot be separated, and gains were not sustained beyond a year in the presence of theft and property insecurity.
- **Social norms regarding violence and atrocities:** No overall effect ($g = -0.00$). Across CBT and STYL, FORNET, and NETfacts, single-study findings were mixed, including modest improvements in some aggression and weapon-carrying attitudes alongside null findings and at least one adverse direction of effect, resulting in a pooled estimate close to zero.
- **Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity:** No overall effect ($g = -0.00$) on shame or broader social disapproval. Some narrower attitudinal changes were reported (for example reduced stigma toward sexual violence survivors in NETfacts, and reduced attachment to military life in FORNET), but these did not translate into consistent improvements in generalized trust or acceptance outcomes, and some effects attenuated over time.
- **Presence and quality of social safety nets:** Narrative review evidence (no effect size reported) suggests improved acceptability and access to services and increased social support in refugee and humanitarian settings, particularly when peer community workers and community mobilisation were used. Because evidence was synthesised narratively and focused on service uptake and support, it is not possible to quantify the size of effect or compare directly with the meta-analytic outcomes above.

Confidence in findings is mixed and often constrained by limited numbers of impact evaluations per outcome, context-specific implementation, and heterogeneity in intervention content and populations. Confidence is low for violence outcomes, economic security, and trust-related outcomes because estimates are based on two studies each and results vary by follow-up period and whether interventions are bundled with cash or other components. Confidence is medium for social norms outcomes and for trauma-related health outcomes because more studies contribute, although effects still vary and some adverse or null findings are present. The large social cohesion effect is based on a single low-confidence study, so it should be treated cautiously. Across outcomes, generalisability beyond the studied settings (predominantly Sub-Saharan Africa, with one study in Gaza and review evidence from refugee settings) is uncertain, and several studies rely on self-reported behaviors or short to medium follow-up.

Table 24 - Effect sizes for MHPSS on conflict and atrocity related outcomes

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Interpretation	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.58	Large effect	1	3
Food security and nutrition; health security	0.26	Large effect	5	25

Economic security	0.03	Little or no effect (small positive)	2	12
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.03	Little or no effect (small positive)	2	8
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	-0.00	No effect	2	8
Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	-0.00	No effect	4	11
Presence and quality of social safety nets	n/a	Positive (narrative synthesis; no effect size)	3	n/a

6.4 Market development and macroeconomic policy – row summary

Market development and macroeconomic policies show mostly small and variable effects on violence and social cohesion. They may result in a large improvement in diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution, but this is a finding from just one study.

Market development and macroeconomic policy interventions aim to stimulate sectoral or economy-wide performance through changes in fiscal or monetary policy, market rules, and investment environments.

In the included studies, interventions clustered into: macroeconomic reform packages linked to international financial institutions; changes in aid volumes as peace incentives after agreements; trade and economic liberalization; donor-financed development projects (including World Bank and Chinese-funded projects); and community-level market institutions such as agricultural cooperatives.

These interventions are expected to reduce conflict risks by improving livelihoods and economic opportunities, stabilizing prices and public finances, and reducing economic grievances. They may also shift incentives toward maintaining peace and enable more diplomatic engagement. However, reforms and aid can also increase inequalities, create economic dislocation, foster dependency, or become contestable resources. Community-level market institutions can strengthen trust among participants while increasing visible divisions between participants and non-participants.

Evidence of effects:

- **Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution:** Large positive effect ($g = 0.37$). Two quantitative studies link (i) higher economic aid after peace agreements and (ii) IMF loan program participation to improved peace process durability or lower ethnic tensions. The IMF evidence also suggests potential adverse effects where large excluded minority groups are present.
- **Nature and scale of violence or atrocities:** Small overall effect ($g = 0.02$) across a larger and diverse evidence base. Findings vary: some studies associate aid or openness with reduced

violence or fewer interstate disputes, while others find localized increases in battle intensity near aid projects or higher short-term civil war risks during liberalization.

- **Economic security (GDP growth):** Little or no overall effect ($g = 0.01$) from one panel study of bundled nation-building packages combining economic aid and military assistance. Economic aid is associated with higher growth during conflict but slower post-conflict recovery, while military assistance shows the opposite pattern. Because effects come from a bundle, they cannot be attributed to macroeconomic policy alone.
- **Intermediate social cohesion (awareness of inequalities):** Small effect ($g = 0.02$) from one study of agricultural cooperatives in rural Burundi, increasing recognition of land inequality without clear improvements in acceptance of disparities.
- **Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity:** Small harmful effect ($g = -0.08$) from the same Burundi cooperative study. Trust appears higher within cooperative members but lower among non-members, reducing overall community-wide trust.

Confidence in findings is mixed. Confidence is medium for violence outcomes because the evidence base is larger, but results are inconsistent across settings, policy types, and timing (during conflict versus post-conflict). Confidence is low for other outcomes because each is supported by only one or two quantitative studies, and effects often depend on context (for example, exclusionary ethnic politics) or on bundled interventions that cannot be disaggregated.

Table 25 - Effect sizes for market development and macroeconomic policy interventions

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Effect interpretation	Evidence base
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.37	Large positive	2 studies; 2 ES
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	0.02	Small	8 studies; 73 ES
Intermediate social cohesion (awareness of inequalities)	0.02	Small	1 study; 4 ES
Economic security (GDP growth)	0.01	Little or no	1 study; 9 ES
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	-0.08	Small harmful	1 study; 4 ES
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	NA	Qualitative	1 qualitative study
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	NA	Qualitative	1 qualitative study

6.5 Land reform and natural resource management (NRM)

Land reform and NRM interventions lead to large improvements in environmental and several human security and social cohesion outcomes, but little or no measurable reduction in violence or interstate diplomatic relations, and governance risks when information is provided only to local leaders.

Land reform refers to policies and interventions that change how land is owned, accessed, used, or governed, with the aim of improving equity, productivity, and social stability. It is most commonly pursued in contexts where land distribution is highly unequal, land tenure is insecure, or land-related disputes contribute to poverty and conflict.

NRM refers to efforts made to strengthen state or community-level management of natural resources, including water, rangelands and forests. This may include participatory management of irrigation systems, water user associations, rangeland/forestry user associations, crop substitution or climate adaptation and/or mitigation. Interventions to support community-based natural resource management groups can comprise elements of conflict resolution training.

The evidence in the included studies covers several types of land reform and NRM intervention. Under land reform are: (1) tenure and land administration reforms formalizing property rights and demarcating parcels; and (2) participatory mapping to document customary lands. NRM interventions in the included studies are: (1) community-driven watershed restoration combining sustainable farming training, reforestation, and local forest management, often bundled with Village Savings and Loan Associations; (2) information and deliberation campaigns on natural resource governance around major discoveries; and (3) cooperative institutions for shared resources, including water treaties and regional economic institutions, sometimes linked to conservation area management.

These approaches aim to reduce conflict risks by strengthening predictable and equitable rules for access to land and resources, and by creating incentives for stewardship and collective action. Tenure security and clearer boundaries can reduce appropriation and disputes and support long-term investment. Livelihood and savings components can increase household resilience and reduce scarcity-driven tension. Information and deliberation are intended to counter elite capture by increasing citizen knowledge, voice, and demand for accountability. Shared-management institutions and cross-border cooperation can provide platforms for dialogue and joint problem-solving, but may have limited effects where political exclusion, power asymmetries, or pre-existing hostilities remain unaddressed.

Land reform and NRM interventions lead to large improvements in environmental and several human security and social cohesion outcomes, but little or no measurable reduction in violence or interstate diplomatic relations. In more detail:

- Environmental and human security outcomes: Watershed restoration (bundled with savings groups and training) showed large improvements in environmental security ($g = 0.91$) and food security and nutrition ($g = 0.60$), and increased girls' secondary enrollment ($g = 0.38$). Economic security impacts were on average large but more modest ($g = 0.21$), with mixed productivity results across tenure reforms and resettlement policies.
- Social cohesion outcomes: Property-rights formalization in Benin had a large effect on intermediate social cohesion ($g = 0.83$) by reducing appropriation and improving respect for ownership. Across settings, NRM interventions had large effects on willingness to participate or

help ($g = 0.49$) and on trust and acceptance of diversity ($g = 0.42$), but these averages mask heterogeneity, including null effects for participatory mapping on trust and conflict measures.

- Governance outcomes: Information and deliberation campaigns in Mozambique increased civic participation ($g = 0.16$), but governance effects were mixed overall (government performance $g = -0.05$). A key nuance is that leader-only information increased elite capture and rent-seeking, while broad citizen information and deliberation improved accountability-related behaviors.
- Conflict and diplomatic outcomes: Across three studies, the estimated effect on the nature and scale of violence was essentially zero and slightly negative ($g = -0.00$), suggesting little or no average impact and possible adverse effects in some contexts when deeper structural drivers are not addressed. Interstate water cooperation had little or no measurable effect on diplomatic relations overall ($g = 0.00$), with qualitative and review evidence suggesting effects may be more likely in lower-conflict settings.

Confidence is mostly low to medium. Many outcomes rely on one study or a small number of studies, and several effect sizes come from a single setting or bundled package where the contribution of land reform or NRM cannot be separated from savings groups, training, or other components. Some estimates come from non-experimental designs or have reporting limitations such as incomplete attrition information. The strongest evidence in this set is from randomized evaluations of tenure-related reforms and large-scale information campaigns, but overall generalizability across contexts remains uncertain.

Table 26 - Reported effect sizes (Hedges g) of Land reform

Outcome	g	Effect category	Studies	Effect sizes
Human security - Environmental security	0.91	Large effect (beneficial)	2	4
Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	0.83	Large effect (beneficial)	1	2
Human security - Food security and nutrition and health security	0.60	Large effect (beneficial)	1	4
Willingness to participate or help	0.49	Large effect (beneficial)	2	2
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	0.42	Large effect (beneficial)	3	41
Human security - Educational security	0.38	Large effect (beneficial)	1	1
Human security - Economic security	0.21	Large effect (beneficial)	3	36

Community and state governance - Civic participation	0.16	Moderate effect (beneficial)	1	42
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.00	Little or no effect (beneficial)	1	1
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	-0.00	Little or no effect (harmful)	3	8
Community and state governance - Government performance	-0.05	Small effect (harmful)	1	63
Community and state governance - Civic participation	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 1	0
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 4	0
Human security - Environmental security	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 4	0
Community and state governance - Government performance	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 3	0
Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 1	0
Willingness to participate or help	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 1	0
Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 1	0
Human security - Economic security	n/a	Qualitative review (no effect size)	or 3	0

6.6 Infrastructure investments: row summary

Infrastructure investments show little or no overall effect on reducing violence – and in some cases increase it - while there is some evidence of a moderate positive effect on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution.

Infrastructure investment interventions involve building or rebuilding physical infrastructure outside of community driven development and reconstruction processes.

The included studies cover two main types of intervention. First, small scale and large scale reconstruction and public works projects implemented in active conflict settings, most prominently through the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan and Iraq. These projects included localized roads, electricity, water supply, and basic service infrastructure delivered rapidly, often by military actors. Second, large scale transport infrastructure connectivity investments focused on roads, railways, ports, and air transport facilities, particularly those associated with China's Belt and Road Initiative, aimed at improving cross border connectivity and trade.

Infrastructure investments are intended to reduce conflict and atrocities by creating short term employment, improving access to services, and supporting longer term economic development. In conflict affected settings, localized projects are expected to generate community support for governing authorities and reduce incentives for violence by addressing immediate needs. At a regional and international level, large scale connectivity investments are expected to support peaceful dispute resolution by increasing trade, economic interdependence, mobility, and shared interests between states. However, infrastructure investments may also increase violence if they draw insurgent attention, exacerbate inequalities, or are poorly aligned with local political and security conditions.

Evidence of effects.

- Nature and scale of violence and atrocities. Infrastructure investments show little or no overall effect on reducing violence ($g = 0.00$). This finding is based on three studies with nine effect sizes examining reconstruction spending under the US-supported Commander's Emergency Response Program. There is important variation within this overall null effect. Small scale projects implemented by localized units and using flexible cash disbursement mechanisms were associated with reductions in violence in some contexts, particularly in Iraq. In contrast, larger projects, especially in Afghanistan, showed no effect or were associated with increased violence. These adverse or null effects may reflect project visibility, targeting in highly insecure areas, or limited flexibility in implementation.
- Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution. Infrastructure investments focused on transport connectivity show a moderate positive effect on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution ($g = 0.15$). This evidence comes from a single global study of Belt and Road related connectivity investments. Effects were stronger in countries with higher governance capacity and weaker in lower capacity settings. These findings are based on bundled connectivity interventions and cannot be disaggregated to isolate the effect of specific infrastructure components.

Confidence in the evidence is low. For violence outcomes, the evidence base is small and consists of non experimental studies conducted in highly specific conflict settings, with mixed findings across project types and contexts. For diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution, confidence is limited by reliance on a single non experimental study. While some patterns are consistent with

proposed mechanisms, the limited number of studies and strong contextual dependence reduce certainty in the overall findings.

Table 27 - Summary of effect sizes of infrastructure investments

Outcome	Effect size (g)	Effect interpretation	Number of studies	Number of effect sizes
Diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	0.15	Moderate effect	1	1
Nature and scale of violence and atrocities	0.00	Little or no effect	3	9

SECTION 3: METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE FOR THIS PROJECT

what is the conflict and atrocity prevention intervention strategies guidebook

The Conflict and Atrocity Prevention (CAP) Guidebook is a resource for intervention strategies to prevent conflict and atrocities. It compiles existing research on 37 sub-categories of interventions related to creating safe environments, conflict management, and mediation and other approaches. The guidebook provides robust evidence to support decision-making across a spectrum of direct and indirect intervention strategies

what is the rationale behind the project

Global conflicts have intensified since 2011, with 59 active conflicts and over 50,000 battle-related deaths in 2023 alone—the highest since 1945 (UCDP). Atrocities have occurred both in and outside of warzones, including the persecution of the Kurds across several countries, Christians in Sudan, Uyghurs in China, Rohingya in Myanmar, and widespread human rights abuses in many countries including Iran, Egypt, and North Korea. Civilians, especially women and children, suffer disproportionately, with over 10 million conflict-linked child deaths (Bendavid et al., 2021), and sexual violence further worsening trauma (Masset, 2022). Gallagher (2022) identified 37 countries affected by mass atrocities since 2000, driven by factors such as economic decline and ethnic divisions (Collier, 2006; Blattman, 2022). Global commitments like SDG 16 and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) highlight the need for both rapid response and structural prevention.

The UK's FCDO has a Migration and Conflict Directorate (MCD), formerly the Office for Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation. To support evidence-based approaches, the team commissioned the Conflict and Atrocity Prevention (CAP) Evidence and Gap Map (EGM), cataloguing 573 studies including 460 quantitative, 89 qualitative, and 25 systematic reviews. An extension to that project – and the basis for this guidebook - provides narrative, cell-wise summaries that synthesize what the evidence says.

what are the objectives of this project

The CAP EGM presented the evidence on what works in an interactive, online EGM.

- This extension of the CAP Evidence and Gap Map (EGM) aims to make evidence on conflict and atrocity prevention more accessible and actionable. It focuses on three key objectives: simplifying and consolidating the EGM to enhance usability by providing narrative summaries for each intervention–outcome area; calculating and compiling effect sizes from quantitative studies in a public database to support faster and more consistent evidence synthesis; and developing an open-access digital platform—the *Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Evidence Portal*—to integrate the EGM, evidence summaries, and effect size data, enabling policymakers, practitioners, and researchers to design evidence-informed prevention strategies.

WHICH OUTCOMES ARE INCLUDED IN THE GUIDEBOOK

The Guidebook assesses the strength of evidence for interventions across a set of four conflict and atrocity prevention strategies outcome domains:

1. Violence and atrocity prevention
2. Social cohesion
3. Community and state governance
4. Human security

We grouped these outcomes into two groups: core (violent conflict and atrocities; social cohesion), and secondary (state and community governance; human security) outcomes. (Annex 1)

The core outcome of **violence and atrocity prevention** is defined across five sub-domains: diplomatic relations, merged with peaceful dispute resolution; justice; the nature and scale of violence and atrocity; sexual and gender-based violence; and social norms related to violence and atrocity.

The second core outcome, **social cohesion**, is reflected in three sub-domains: feelings of trust, merged with acceptance of diversity; a sense of belonging; and a willingness to participate or provide support.

The **secondary outcome of state and community governance** is measured through five sub-domains: access to justice, rights, services, civil participation, government performance, social safety nets, and transitions of power.

Finally, the outcome of **human security** is captured through seven sub-domains: economic security; education; food and nutrition, merged with health; physical security; political security; environmental security; and intermediate social cohesion.

Each study in the EGM is categorized under an outcome category and sub- category. The cell summaries are focussed on a particular outcome sub-category. The cells refer to the outcome sub-categories, and outcome level effect is also extracted sub-category wise. The direction of the effects - positive, negative or null - are clearly mentioned in the cells.

In the map, the cell summaries also include more detail, with the specific outcomes evidenced in each study. In the full evidence description, downloadable in a PDF, all measures used in a study and outcome – whether positive, none, or harmful– are mentioned. This allows users to see the details of each cell.

HOW WERE INTERVENTIONS SELECTED FOR INCLUSION IN THE GUIDEBOOK?

Interventions are selected for inclusion in the Guidebook from the first edition of the EGM. For the extension project some of the interventions were merged (Annex 1).

We adapted the approach taken in Cramer et al. (2016) and Sonnenfeld et al. (2020) to group interventions as either direct or indirect. “Direct” interventions are prevention efforts that directly respond to an escalating conflict or atrocity by strengthening social well-being, empathy and conflict resolution, supporting State diplomacy, law and accountability processes, oversight and post-conflict justice, and ending violence to build a safe and secure environment. “Indirect” interventions provide the supportive

environment for peace, including building a strong and inclusive civil society, inclusive and accountable governance and justice institutions at national, subnational, and local levels, and sustainable economic foundations to support capabilities. Indirect interventions are therefore “upstream” prevention efforts that address aspects such as socio-economic factors that may or may not lead to conflict or atrocities. We included all studies of policies or programmes that had explicit CAP aims. Where CAP aims were not explicit in reports, we still included some studies based on the combination of interventions and outcomes evaluated.

Interventions are grouped into six categories (with sub-categories): safe environments (e.g., policing, early warning systems); international diplomacy, law and accountability (e.g., support for peace processes & negotiation, sanctions, aid conditionalities); conflict management and mediation at community level (e.g., intergroup dialogue); support to civil society (e.g., civil-society organisation (CSO) capacity building, countering disinformation in communication, digital and media) support to governance and justice institutions (e.g., support for elections); and economic foundations (e.g., job creation, in-kind and cash transfers).

Ineligible interventions were those targeting intra- or interpersonal violent conflict, such as those to address intra-household violence, or those targeting criminal or gang inter-group violence, as defined above.

WHAT KIND OF EVIDENCE IS INCLUDED IN THE GUIDEBOOK

The map includes completed and ongoing primary studies and evidence syntheses pertaining to the effectiveness of Conflict prevention and Atrocity prevention interventions in Low & Middle Income Countries. Eligible primary studies used quantitative, and qualitative designs, appropriate to the interventions being evaluated, to assess the effectiveness of the intervention(s). Impact evaluation designs use methods like randomised assignment of individuals or groups to intervention (randomised controlled trials, RCTs) or quasi-experimental designs (QEDs) such as encouragement design, discontinuity design, difference-in-differences, statistical matching, synthetic control and reflexive control (outcomes data collection among participants before versus after intervention only).

We also included qualitative research with a study design that was able to identify causal relationships between interventions and outcomes. Studies using established theory-based qualitative methodologies to evaluate effectiveness were included, but we also incorporated case studies with theory-based designs. The studies including Realist Evaluation, General Elimination Methodology (GEM), Process Tracing and Contribution Analysis. Group II approaches use participatory data collection methods, such as Most Significant Change (MSC), Success Case Method (SCM), Outcome Harvesting (OH) and Method for Impact Assessment of Programs and Projects (MAPP), which were included where they explicitly sought to identify a causal relationship between the intervention(s) and outcome(s) of interest.

We also included systematic evidence syntheses, including systematic reviews and meta-analyses, systematic scoping reviews and rigorous literature reviews.

HOW DID THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS WORK

The guidebook and EGM address questions such as *what the evidence says* by focusing on the analysis stages. It uses the studies included in the first edition of the Evidence and Gap Map (EGM). Therefore, for this guidebook and the evidence platform, we did not repeat the processes of searching, screening, and coding studies. The focus was solely on analysis.

The evidence in the original EGM was identified through searches of multidisciplinary electronic databases and donor evaluation repositories. We also searched organisational repositories, registries of trials and evidence syntheses, online repositories of books, book chapters, theses, and dissertations, and hand-searched relevant journals.

The work was carried out in parallel phases:

- For impact evaluation studies, coders extracted effect size data.
- For qualitative studies and systematic reviews, coders produced narrative syntheses of each included study or review.

GUIDELINES FOR CELL-WISE SUMMARIES

The following established guidelines were used for cell-level synthesis:

- If a cell contains **only reviews**, the summary is based on those reviews.
- If a cell contains both **reviews and qualitative studies**, the summary is based on the reviews.
- If a cell contains both **reviews and quantitative studies**, both types are summarized.
- If a cell contains only **quantitative studies**, the summary is based on those studies.
- If a cell contains only **qualitative studies**, the summary is based on those studies.

Based on this classification, we identified the cells where summaries are based on **quantitative studies** and extracted all relevant **effect sizes**. The coders were trained in two days online training course and briefed on the project objectives. They initially conducted a pilot phase, extracting data from 20 studies. Following the piloting stage, they proceeded to extract effect sizes from 460 quantitative studies.

Parallel to the quantitative work, other teams worked on the **narrative summaries**, particularly for cells that included **qualitative studies and systematic reviews** that did not involve effect size extraction.

From each study, we extracted data related to:

- Main findings related to the research question
- Intervention classification and description
- Outcome description
- Theory of change, causal mechanisms, barriers, and facilitators

- Contextual factors

We then developed **cell-level summaries** consistent with the format used for quantitative summaries.

WHAT ARE EVIDENCE STANDARDS

Evidence standards are applied to assess the level of confidence we have in the findings of the studies included in each cell, and the overall cellwise assessment. We used standardized tools to assess the confidence ratings of individual studies and developed specific guidelines to summarize these ratings at the cell level.

The confidence ratings of the individual study was assessed using appropriate tools tailored to the study design. This included both large-n studies (e.g., RCTs and quasi-experimental designs) and small-n qualitative designs (e.g., theory-based case studies and contribution analyses), as well as existing systematic reviews and evidence syntheses.

- Systematic reviews were assessed using the AMSTAR 2 tool (Shea et al., 2017).
- Large-n quantitative studies were evaluated using an approach developed by the Campbell Secretariat. This approach considered elements such as study design, intervention and outcome descriptions, sample size, attrition, quality of measurement, and clarity of the evaluation question.
- Small-n qualitative studies were assessed using a framework developed by Sharma Waddington et al. (2023), which includes factors such as use of a theory of change, clarity in data collection and analysis, sample selection, triangulation, and strategies to reduce bias.

The cell-wise confidence assessment depends on the type of evidence used for the summary (type of study), critical appraisal of included studies and consistency. To assess we use the 'mark down' principle. The first two criteria establish the rating. The rating may be marked down based on the second two criteria.

Each cell is categorized into one of the following confidence levels: high confidence, medium confidence and low confidence

These confidence levels are determined using the criteria outlined in Table 27.

Table 28 - Confidence Rating of Cells

Study type	Numbers	Rules for rating
Systematic review	One review	Same rating as systematic review
	More than one review	All reviews have same rating: use that
		Reviews have different ratings: use rating from review most relied upon in the summary
		Plus, mark down one rating if review findings not consistent
Large n studies	All studies rated low	Rate low
	Fewer than 4 studies	Rate low
	4-7 studies	Medium
	8 or more	High
		Plus, mark down rating if majority of studies not rated high
		Plus, mark down one rating if review findings not consistent
Small n	Low confidence	
Assessing consistency	Consistent	All study-level effect sizes for the outcome in same effect band
		OR All study effect sizes are within +/- 0.1 of each other

For cells containing narrative studies, effect sizes were not available. Therefore, we used a predefined set of criteria to assess the confidence in findings. The appraisal of each cell is based on the confidence ratings of the included studies.

Small-n qualitative studies were largely rated as low confidence, primarily due to limited discussion of triangulation and insufficient information on measures taken to mitigate key sources of bias.

UNDERSTANDING IMPACT IN THE GUIDEBOOK

Impact is the change in outcomes resulting from an intervention's ability to reduce conflict, atrocities, and related prevention outcomes. In simple terms, it asks: *To what extent has an intervention contributed to reducing conflict and atrocities? Has it brought about a significant change or only a minor one, if any?*

It is important to distinguish impact from strength of evidence. While *impact* refers to the magnitude of change brought about by an intervention, *strength of evidence* indicates how confident we can be that the observed change was actually caused by the intervention. The strength of evidence is based on the size and consistency of the evidence base, and the confidence we can have in the findings in the studies in that evidence base.

Approaches to Calculating Effect Sizes

Effect size is a standardized measure used in impact evaluations to assess the change in outcomes associated with an intervention. It is a statistical measure of the *impact* an intervention has on an outcome. Various metrics can be used, such as:

- Standardized Mean Difference (SMD or d)
- Odds Ratio (OR)
- Correlation Coefficient (r)

Regardless of the specific measure, effect sizes should:

- Be comparable across studies, even when different measurement instruments are used.
- Reflect the magnitude of an intervention's effect, rather than being influenced by factors like sample size or study design.

To compute effect sizes, we extracted key statistical data from studies, including sample sizes for treatment and control groups, standard deviations for continuous outcomes, and other relevant metrics (see: Lipsey & Wilson, 2001; Waddington et al., 2012; Higgins et al., 2021).

The three most commonly used effect size measures in the CAP EGM are:

1. Standardized Mean Difference (d): For continuous outcomes (e.g., change in levels of intergroup trust or social cohesion).
2. Odds Ratio (OR): For binary outcomes (e.g., occurrence vs. non-occurrence of violent incidents).
3. Correlation Coefficient (r): For continuous treatment variables (e.g., relationship between the intensity of peacebuilding activities and reductions in local conflict events).

Qualitative Studies and Systematic Reviews

For qualitative studies and systematic reviews where quantitative data was unavailable, impacts were assessed using narrative synthesis. This involved analyzing and summarizing the direction and nature of reported effects (positive, none, mixed, or harmful), based on how the intervention influenced outcomes in various contexts.

HOW DOES THE GUIDEBOOK REPORT IMPACT

The guidebook reports the impacts of interventions based on the methodology of the studies in a cell, using two primary approaches:

Quantitative Studies: For quantitative studies, we extracted effect sizes using the unit of measurement reported in the original studies—such as Cohen's *d*, Hedges' *g*, Odds Ratio, or Risk Ratio. These were all converted to Cohen's *d* to enable comparability. The magnitude of the effect was categorized using the following ranges:

Table 29 - Effect Size Ranges for Conflict and Violence Outcomes

Effect size ranges for conflict and violence outcomes

<-0.01	Harmful effect
-0.01 - 0.01	No effect
0.01-0.1	Small effect
0.1 - 0.2	Moderate effect
Above 0.2	Large effect

Qualitative Studies and Systematic Reviews: Where quantitative effect sizes were not available, the impact of interventions was assessed qualitatively, based on the reported direction of effect. The interpretation is as follows:

Positive:

- If the presence of XYZ has been reported as necessary in achieving the outcome, with a direct effect on the outcome, and XYZ is present, then the effect is assessed as positive. For example, in case of the effect of peace processes and diplomacy on food security, nutrition, and health security, we find that the presence of United Nations involvement was crucial in achieving lasting peace in Mozambique which had a direct effect on the outcome.

Moderate

- A *moderate effect* indicates that the presence of a factor, like XYZ, may initially seem positive but fails to create long-term structural changes. This results in only a moderate effect, meaning the intervention causes a noticeable but not a large or consistently strong improvement in outcomes. For instance, while election observers boost legitimacy (a

positive outcome), they don't achieve the lasting political stability required for genuine, enduring peace. Another case is when there are two studies in one cell reporting on an outcome. For example, the effect of peace processes and diplomacy on economic security, we find a mixed impact with limited and uneven economic gain that often fails to reach the broader population (Adedokun, 2019; Richmond, 2009)

None:

- if the presence of XYZ has been reported as having a positive effect but it is not achieving the outcomes for lasting effect. For example, in case of assessing the effect of peace processes and diplomacy on transitions of power, we find that the presence of Independent Election Observers increases the legitimacy of the election and acceptance of the result but is unlikely to achieve the structural changes necessary for lasting peace (Skinner, 2012).

Harmful:

- if the presence of XYZ has been reported as negative in achieving any outcome(s), and XYZ is present. For example, in the case of assessing the effect of foundational state design processes, transitional political processes, and election support on a sense of belonging we find that it is attributed toThe outcome is attributed to the lack of effective state design, transitional processes, and credible elections (Gilbert, 2019).

(Another explanation could be written as)- A harmful (negative) effect indicates that an intervention produces a noticeable, detrimental impact on outcome(s), suggesting the change is counterproductive. This harm is perceptible but not overwhelmingly large, meaning the negative results are not consistently severe, but still adverse. For instance, Gilbert (2019) found that the negative impact on citizens' sense of belonging is directly attributed to the ineffectiveness of foundational state design processes, transitional political processes, and election support

WHERE DOES THE GUIDEBOOK REPORT EFFECT SIZES

Effect size information, where available, is reported in several places in the evidence platform. It is first presented in the top entry in the list of studies of each cell-wise summary, offering a quick reference to the magnitude of the intervention's impact. Further details are provided in the narrative section of the cell summaries under "evidence findings," which elaborates on the context and interpretation of the effect sizes. Additionally, a screenshot from the meta-analysis application is included at the end of each cell summary to visually represent the data. Each of these cell summaries is also available for download as a PDF from the interactive evidence platform interface. Finally, all cell summaries, including effect size details, are compiled and included in the annex section of the guidebook for comprehensive reference.

Interactive evidence platform interface

The screenshot shows an interactive evidence platform interface. On the left, there is a sidebar with filters and a list of studies. The main area displays a list of studies with their titles, authors, and years. A detailed summary for the study 'Effect of Military operations on Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution' is shown on the right. The interface includes a search bar, a filter dropdown, and a 'Read full article' link.

Annotations in the image include:

- A yellow box pointing to the 'Effect of Military operations on Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution' study in the list, with the text: "Clicking here will bring up, in the main box below, the summary of our synthesis of all the studies in this cell".
- A yellow box pointing to the list of studies, with the text: "List of all the studies in the cell".
- A yellow box pointing to the colored dots next to the study titles, with the text: "These dots show the confidence level of the studies and cells".
- A yellow box pointing to the 'Read full article' link, with the text: "Link to the full pdf of the cell summary".
- A yellow box pointing to the detailed summary on the right, with the text: "This box has the summary of our synthesis of all the studies in the cell".

Cell Summaries

Effect of military operations on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution

Interventions supporting rebels have a moderate effect on negotiations but weaken agreement stability, whereas military backing for government hinders negotiations, but strengthens agreements.

Geographical region: Global

Effect: Moderate effect ($g = 0.107$)

Confidence in study findings: Low confidence

Short summary

Military interventions aim to prevent, de-escalate, or resolve conflicts and may affect diplomatic relations and dispute resolution by shaping negotiations and agreement stability. Interventions supporting rebels have a moderate effect on negotiations but weaken agreement stability, whereas military backing for government hinders negotiations, but strengthens agreements. Mediation and security guarantees have the most positive effects. Military support for the government makes agreements more likely to be upheld, while support for rebels lowers this likelihood. As suggested by these results, the effect depends on context, conflict stage, and strategic considerations; for example, military intervention is more likely to have a positive effect if the conflict-affected state is a democracy, and parties are more willing to enter negotiations if the conflict has reached a stalemate.

HOW SHOULD THE COLOUR CODING IN CELL SUMMARIES BE INTERPRETED

The colour coding in the cell summaries provides a quick visual reference for interpreting the strength and direction of evidence.

For quantitative studies, the colour of the cell box reflects the magnitude of the reported effect: green indicates a large or medium positive effect, amber represents a small positive effect, grey denotes no significant effect, and red signals evidence of an adverse or harmful effect.

For qualitative studies and systematic reviews, the colour is determined by combining the study's critical appraisal rating with the direction of the effect. Studies rated as low confidence are marked grey regardless of the reported effect. Medium and high confidence studies reporting positive effects are shown in orange, while those indicating harmful effects are marked red. Studies with medium or high confidence but reporting no effect remain grey. This colour-coding scheme helps users interpret both the strength of findings and the quality of underlying evidence in each cell. The choice of colours reflects the fact that we have lower confidence in causal claims from the qualitative studies than we do from the quantitative studies. So no cell based on qualitative studies will be coded green.

Colour coding of Quantitative studies

Large/moderate effect	Green
Small	Amber
No	Grey
Adverse	Red

Colour coding of qualitative and systematic review

	Harmful	None	Positive
Low	Grey	Grey	Grey
Medium	Red	Grey	Orange
High	Red	Grey	Orange

Colour coding in cell summaries top box

<p>Effect of military operations on diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution</p> <p>Interventions supporting rebels have a moderate effect on negotiations but weaken agreement stability, whereas military backing for government hinders negotiations, but strengthens agreements.</p> <p>Geographical region: Global</p> <p>Effect: Moderate effect ($g = 0.107$)</p> <p>Confidence in study findings: Low confidence</p>
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Short summary

Military interventions aim to prevent, de-escalate, or resolve conflicts and may affect diplomatic relations and dispute resolution by shaping negotiations and agreement stability. Interventions supporting rebels have a moderate effect on negotiations but weaken agreement stability, whereas military backing for government hinders negotiations, but strengthens agreements. Mediation and security guarantees have the most positive effects. Military support for the government makes agreements more likely to be upheld, while support for rebels lowers this likelihood. As suggested by these results, the effect depends on context, conflict stage, and strategic considerations; for example, military intervention is more likely to have a positive effect if the conflict-affected state is a democracy, and parties are more willing to enter negotiations if the conflict has reached a stalemate.

HOW SHOULD EVIDENCE RATINGS BE INTERPRETED AND APPLIED

Each cell summary in the map has been assigned an evidence rating, which reflects the overall strength and consistency of evidence of the studies falling within that cell. These ratings are the result of the critical appraisal of each individual study. Critical appraisal provides an assessment of the design, conduct and reporting of a study, and so the confidence we can have in the study findings. The cell-wise evidence rating is based on the number of studies in a cell, the consistency of their findings, and the rating of the individual studies. Evidence ratings are not policy recommendations; rather, they provide an indication of where the evidence is strongest and where caution or further investigation may be needed in the use of evidence.

WHAT OUR EVIDENCE DOESN'T COVER

What the evidence doesn't cover falls into two categories: interventions excluded from the original EGM, and interventions included in the EGM but for which we found very few eligible studies.

The following fall into the first category, that is interventions not included in the map:

- Gang-Related or Gang-Motivated Violence

Interventions that specifically target gang-related or gang-motivated violence are excluded, even when the violence may superficially resemble intergroup conflict.

- *Gang-related violence* is defined as incidents involving at least one gang member, including any self-reported or confirmed affiliation at any point (adapted from Winfree et al., 1992; Esbensen et al., 2001).
- *Gang-motivated violence* refers to acts driven by gang-specific objectives such as territorial control, retaliation, or enforcement of gang norms (adapted from Decker & Pyrooz, 2010).

- Interpersonal, Intrapersonal, or Household-Level Violence

The map does not include studies that focus on individual or domestic violence. This includes:

- *Interpersonal violence* (e.g., intimate partner violence).
- *Intrapersonal conflict* (e.g., self-harm or suicide).
- *Violence within households* (e.g., child abuse or elder abuse).
These forms of violence are outside the remit of intergroup or collective conflict.

- Protection and Rehabilitation-Focused Interventions

This map is intentionally limited to *prevention* strategies. Interventions focused on *protection* (e.g., safe shelters, emergency aid, or shielding vulnerable populations during conflict) or *rehabilitation* (e.g., trauma counselling, reintegration of ex-combatants) are excluded—unless they are directly and explicitly linked to broader violence prevention objectives.

- **High-Income Country (HIC)-Focused Interventions**
We exclude studies conducted solely in HICs unless the intervention explicitly seeks to mitigate conflict involving LMIC populations. For example, a peace education intervention targeting Israeli citizens to reduce tensions with Palestinian communities would be included; a similar programme aimed only at reducing domestic polarization within a HIC would not.
- **Timeframe Limitations**
We include only studies published from the year 2000 onwards, ensuring the relevance of evidence to contemporary contexts and methods.
 - Interventions must have been implemented in or after 1990, reflecting a post-decolonisation landscape.
 - An exception is made for studies relating to the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, which are excluded due to their distinct geopolitical and military nature.


Regarding the second category of what is not covered, that is evidence gaps in the map, we found:

1. Few studies focus solely on atrocity prevention (5%).
2. Limited research on interventions in emerging or pre-crisis conflicts.
3. Long-term and systemic prevention strategies are underrepresented.
4. Integrated approaches combining conflict and atrocity prevention are not well-covered.

Confidence in research design and conduct

We found 25 evidence syntheses (4%). Primary studies used a range of designs, most commonly large-n quantitative approaches (459 studies; 80%) including randomised controlled trials, of which we included 127 RCTs (22%), and 333 quasi-experiments (58%; e.g., Best et al., 2011) (Figure 78). However, a significant minority of studies (n=89; 16%) used small-n theory-based qualitative approaches to measure the causal effect of the intervention strategy.


Figure 8: Types of study designs in the EGM



Evidence synthesis studies


We used AMSTAR2 (Shea et al., 2021) to appraise evidence synthesis studies (Figure 89). There are 16 total categories across seven critical domains, and overall confidence based on the assessment in the critical domains. We have modified the critical domains and include five critical items (1) adequacy of the literature search, (2) justification for excluding individual studies, (3) risk of bias from individual studies being included in the review, (4) appropriateness of meta-analytical methods, and (5) consideration of risk of bias when interpreting the results of the review.

Figure 9: Assessment of evidence synthesis studies



Eight studies (32% of the 25 completed synthesis studies) were assessed overall as at ‘high confidence’ based on the critical domains in the tool (Figure 910). Three studies were assessed as being of ‘medium confidence’ which meant more than one non-critical items, but ten (40%) studies were of ‘low confidence’ meaning that there was one critical flaw with non-critical weaknesses. A further four studies were rated as of ‘critically low confidence’, meaning that there were multiple critical flaws. Overall, the included evidence synthesis studies clearly reported the PICO components and search strategies and the list of databases and grey literature searched, but did not always transparently and adequately assess the risk of bias in the evidence included in the studies. Most studies also did not report important aspects of evidence synthesis including publication of a study protocol, reporting of funding sources or assessment of publication bias.

Figure 10: Overall confidence in evidence synthesis studies




Large-n quantitative studies

We assessed the confidence in findings of the included studies based on key features including study design, methodology and reporting. The confidence assessment tool was developed by the Campbell Collaboration for EGMs. The tool contains critical dimensions of the evaluation, each of which is marked as 'high confidence', 'medium confidence', and 'low confidence'. The overall score uses the 'weakest link in the chain' (or maxi-min) principle. Hence, the confidence in study findings can only be as high as the lowest rating given to the nine critical items in effectiveness studies.

In this map, 6 percent of the completed large-n quantitative studies (n=28) were rated as of 'high confidence', 43 percent (n=193) were rated as of 'medium confidence' and 51 percent (n=226) were rated as of 'low confidence' (Figure 22) [6]. The studies scored highly in terms of framing the evaluation questions, detailing the intervention and the outcomes, and regarding attrition (losses to follow-up or drop-outs) of study participants. Attrition is not always a relevant factor in impact evaluations, as in the case of studies that use cross-sectional evidence; these studies were not scored against attrition.

Thirty-two percent of the completed large-n quantitative studies (n=143) were rated as of 'low confidence' due to the absence of reporting on attrition (losses to follow-up). However, we did not consider reporting about power calculations as a critical item in the assessment. Many studies relied on existing data sources and hence did not need to perform tests to determine whether sample sizes were sufficient for detecting effects beforehand, in order to define the optimum sample size for data collection (i.e. power calculations). While power is still relevant in these studies (e.g., power to estimate effects overall or for particular population sub-groups) we opted not to mark down these types of studies if they did not report tests of this nature for the purposes of our confidence assessments.


Figure 11: Assessment of large-n quantitative studies



Small-n qualitative studies

There were in total 89 small-n studies included in the evidence map (16%). As shown in Figure 1112, based on our assessment criteria, three studies (3% of the small-n studies) were rated overall at 'medium certainty': these studies were coded as at either 'medium' or 'high certainty' on each of the seven criteria. The other 86 studies (97%) were of 'low certainty' overall, meaning that they were assessed as at 'low certainty' for at least one of the seven items. No study was rated as at 'high certainty' overall (i.e., none was rated as at 'high certainty' on all items).

Figure 12: Assessment of small-n qualitative studies



ANNEXURE 1 - SUMMARY TABLES OF INCLUDED STUDIES

INT.CAT	OUT.CAT	NO. OF STUDIES	REGION	EFFECT SIZE	CONFIDENCE
SAFE ENVIRONMENTS					
Policing and Public security	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	6	East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa	No effect (g=0.007)	Low (6 studies with 20 effect sizes)
	feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	1	Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia	Small effect (g=0.08)	Low (1 study with 1 effect size)
	access to justice, rights and public services	2	Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Global	Small effect (g=0.045)	Low (2 studies with 4 effect sizes)
	government performance	5	South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa	No effect (g=-0.004)	Low (5 studies with 21 effect sizes)

	physical security	3	South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.453)	Low (3 studies with 22 effect sizes)
	political security	1	Middle East and North Africa	Small effect (g=0.034)	Medium (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
Military Operations	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	2	Global	Moderate effect (g = 0.107)	Low confidence
	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	15	Global, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g = -0.013)	Medium confidence (15 quantitative studies with 53 effect sizes)
	Government performance	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g = 0.138)	Low confidence
	Presence and quality of social safety nets	1	Global	Small effect (g = -0.005)	Low confidence
	Economic security	2	South Asia, Global	Small effect (g = -0.015)	Low confidence
	Physical security	1	South Asia	Moderate effect (g = 0.114)	Low confidence
	Political security	1	Global	Large effect (g = 0.34)	Low confidence
Disarmament, Demobilisation And	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	8	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g = 0.16)	Medium confidence

Reintegration Of Ex-Combatants & Peace Support/Keeping Operations	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	26	Global, Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, East Asia & Pacific.	Small effect (g = 0.058)	Medium confidence
	Sexual and gender-based violence	1	Global	Harmful effect (g = -0.295)	Low Confidence
	Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	3	Latin America & Caribbean (1), Sub Saharan Africa (2)	Small effect (g = 0.081)	Low confidence
	feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	2	Middle East & North Africa, Europe & Central Asia	Small effect (g = 0.043)	Medium
	Sense of belonging	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g = 0.094)	Low. Only one low quality study.
	Access to justice, rights and public services	1	Global	Large effect (g= 0.351)	Low confidence (1 study with 4 effect size)
	Civic participation	2	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g = 0.024)	Low confidence
	Government performance	3	Middle East & North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g = -0.066)	Low confidence
	Transitions of power	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Global	Moderate effect (g = 0.138)	Low confidence
	Economic Security	8	Sub Saharan Africa, Global	Small effect (g = 0.061)	Low confidence

	Educational Security	2	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect size (g = 0.078)	Low confidence
	Food security and nutrition & Health security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g = 0.07)	Low confidence
	Physical security	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g = 0.034)	Low confidence
	Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	1	Latin America & Caribbean	Small effect (g = 0.06)	Low confidence
Support To Civilians And Non-State Armed Groups	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	1	Latin America & Caribbean	Harmful effect (g=-0.178)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
DIplomacy, LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY					
Diplomatic Recognition + Other Diplomatic Efforts	diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	1	Middle East & North Africa	Small effect (g=0.081)	Low confidence (1 studies; 3 ES)
	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	11	Middle East & North Africa, Europe & Central Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, Global	No effect (g= -0.001)	Low confidence (11 studies; 40 ES)

	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g= -0.206)	Low confidence (1 study; 2 ES)
	feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity	2	South Asia, Middle East & North Africa	Small effect (g= 0.093)	Low confidence (2 studies; 10 ES)
	access to justice, rights and public services	1	sub-Saharan Africa	Moderate Effect (g= 0.109)	Low confidence (1 study; 6 ES)
	government performance	1	sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.06)	Low confidence (1 study; 4 ES)
	economic security	1	Middle East & North Africa	Small effect (g= 0.039)	Low confidence (1 study; 4 ES)
	food and nutrition security and health security	1	sub-Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.186)	Low confidence (1 study; 4 ES)
	political security	2	Global	Moderate effect (g=0.139)	Low confidence (2 studies; 4 ES)
Human Security Law + International Criminal Court (ICC) Or Regional Equivalent	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	3	Global	Large effect (g=0.437)	Low (3 studies with 53 effect sizes)
	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	6	Sub Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.383)	Low (6 studies with 46 effect sizes)
	willingness to participate or help	1	Europe and Central Asia	Small effect (g=-0.16)	Low (1 study with 11 effect sizes)

	Food security and nutrition & Health Security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.65)	Low (1 study with 10 effect sizes)
	Political security	2	Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.308)	Low (2 studies with 8 effect sizes)
Peace Processes And Diplomacy	diplomatic relations	5	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.337)	Medium (5 studies with 13 effect sizes)
	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	9	Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.44)	Medium (9 studies with 28 effect sizes)
	economic security	3	Sub Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean	Large effect (g=0.63)	Low (3 studies with 10 effect sizes)
	physical security	2	Global, Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=1.422)	Low (2 studies with 5 effect sizes)
	political security	2	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	No effect (g=0.001)	Low (2 studies with 12 effect sizes)
	environmental security	2	Latin America and Caribbean	Harmful effect (g=-0.008)	Low (2 studies with 4 effect sizes)
	Sanctions	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	24	Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.13)

social norms regarding violence and atrocities	1	Middle East and North Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.053)	Low (1 study with 5 effect sizes)
feelings of trust & acceptance of diversity	2	Middle East and North Africa, Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.111)	Medium (2 studies with 3 effect sizes)
willingness to participate or help	1	Middle East and North Africa (West Gaza)	Harmful effect (g=-0.218)	Medium (1 study with 1 effect size)
access to justice, rights, and public services	2	Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.114)	Medium (2 studies with 17 effect sizes)
civic participation	2	Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.104)	Low (2 studies with 11 effect sizes)
government performance	5	Global	Large effect (g=0.288)	Low (5 studies with 9 effect sizes)
economic security	21	Global, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia	Harmful effect (g=-0.001)	Medium (21 studies with 71 effect sizes)
food security and nutrition & health security	2	Global, Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g = -0.005)	Low (2 studies with 13 effect sizes)
political security	6	Global	Small effect (g=0.027)	Medium (6 studies with 19 effect sizes)

Aid assistance and aid conditionalities	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	1	Global	Large effect (g=0.347)	Low confidence (1 study; 01 ES)
	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	4	Global, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g= - 0.018)	low confidence (4 studies; 35 ES)
	economic security	1	Global	Small effect (g=0.052)	Low confidence (1 study; 11 ES)
Research, Monitoring, And Assessments	Diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	2	Global (post-civil war countries)	Moderate effect (g=0.139)	low confidence (2 studies with 15 Effect size)
	Nature & scale of violence or atrocities	9	Global, East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, Sub-saharan Africa, middle east & North Africa	Small effect (g=0.022)	Low (9 studies with 44 effect size)
	willingness to participate or help	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.247)	Low (1 study with one effect size)
	Civic Participation	1	Sub-saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g = - 0.03)	Low (1 study with 3 effect size)
	Political security	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.055)	Low (1 study with 6 effect sizes)
Dispute resolution	Diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	4	Global	Large effect (g = 0.207)	Low confidence (4 studies 35 effect size)
	Nature & scale of violence or atrocity	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g = 0.03)	Low confidence (2 studies with 25 effect size)

	Social norms regarding Violence or Atrocity	2	Sub Saharan Africa & Middle East & North Africa	Harmful effect (g = -0.132)	Low (2 studies with 5 effect size)
	Feeling of Trust & Acceptance of Diversity	6	Sub Saharan Africa & Middle East & North Africa	Moderate effect (g = 0.133)	Low confidence (6 studies with 28 Effect size)
	willingness to Participate or help	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.28)	Low (one study with 5 effect size)
	Access to Justice, right & Public Services	2	East Asia & pacific, Middle East & North Africa	large effect (g = 0.479)	Low confidence (2 studies with 9 effect size)
	Civic Participation	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= -0.041)	Low confidence (1 study s with 9 effect size)
	Government Performance	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia	Small effect (g = 0.03)	Low (2 studies with 9 effect size)
	Economic Security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.077)	Low confidence (1 study with 11 effect size)
	Physical Security	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.288)	low (2 studies with 7 effect sizes)
Intergroup contact + Peace education	diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolutions	3	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.203)	Low confidence (3 studies; 24 ES)
	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	8	Europe & Central Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia	Moderate effect (g=0.15)	Low confidence Low (8 studies; 47 ES)

	Sense of belonging	5	Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.089)	Low Confidence (5 studies; 14 ES)
	food and nutrition and health security	2	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g= 0.535)	Low confidence (2 studies: 10 ES)
	willingness to participate or help	17	Europe & Central Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia	Moderate effect (g=0.189)	Low confidence (17studies; 87 ES)
	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	13	Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean	Large effect (g=0.442)	Low confidence (13 studies; 54 ES)
	civic participation	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.108)	Low confidence (1 study; 08 ES)
	feeling of trust and acceptance of diversity	60	Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean, Global	Large effect (g=0.249)	Low confidence (60 studies; 371ES)
	government performance	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-2.029)	Low Confidence (1 study ;7 ES)

	physical security	1	Europe & Central Asia	Harmful effect (g= -0.046)	Low confidence (1 study: 3 ES)
	political security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.04)	Low confidence (01 study; 02 ES)
	Economic Security	3	Middle East & North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.089)	Low confidence (3 studies: 67 ES)
	Intermediate social cohesion outcomes	30	Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific	Large effect (g=0.316)	Low confidence (30 studies; 190 ES)
	Educational Security	4	Europe & Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.086)	Low confidence (4 studies: 13 ES)
Media and communication	Nature & scale of atrocity prevention	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.014)	Low (one study with 6 effect sizes)
	social norms of violence or atrocity prevention	9	Sub-saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle east & North africa	Small effect (g=0.014)	Medium (9 studies with 54 effect size)
	Feelings of trust & Acceptance of diversity	9	Sub-Saharan Africa	small effect (g = 0.015)	Low (9 studies with 49 effect size)

	Willingness to participate or help	4	Sub - Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.108)	Low (4 study with 19 effect sizes)
	Access to Justice, right & Public Services	1	Sub -Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g= 0.148)	Low (1 study with 9 effect sizes)
	Civic Participation	6	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.049)	Low (6 studies with 13 effect size)
	Government Performance	2	Sub -Saharan Africa	No effect (g=-0.006)	Low (2 studies with 14 effect size)
	Economic Security	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g = - 0.013)	Low (1 study with 3 effect size)
	Political Security	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.05)	Low (1 study with 4 effect size)
	Intermediate Social Cohesion Outcome	6	Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle east & North Africa	Small effect (g = 0.025)	Low (6 studies with 40 effect sizes)
Social inclusion and reintegration activities	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful Dispute Resolution	1	East asia & pacific	Small effect (g = 0.042)	Low (1 study with 1 effect size)
	Nature & Scale of Violence or atrocities	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g = 0.012)	Low (1 study with 4 effect size)
	Feeling of Trust & Acceptance of Diversity	2	East asia & pacific & Europe & Central Asia Indonesia	Small effect (g=0.056)	low (2 study with 24 effect size)

	Access to justice, rights & public services	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g = 0.007)	low (1 study with 8 effect size)
	Civic participation	1	East Asia & Pacific	No effect (g = 0.003)	low (1 study with 2 effect size)
	Government Performance	1	East Asia & Pacific	No effect (g = 0)	low (1 study with 4 effect size)
	Economic Security	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g = 0.036)	Low (1 study with 7 Effect size)
	Educational Security	1	East Asia & Pacific	No effect (g=0.000)	low (1 study with 1 Effect size)
	Food Security & Nutrition & Health Security	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g = -0.027)	low (1 study with 2 effect size)
	Environmental security	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g= 0.045)	low (1 study with 1 effect size)
CIVIL SOCIETY					
Civil society capacity building + Civic engagement and empowerment initiatives	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	1	East Asia & Pacific	Harmful effect (g=-0.088)	Low confidence (01 study; 2 ES)
	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.102)	Low confidence (2 studies; 14 ES)
	Feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.058)	Low confidence (2 studies; 4 ES)
	sense of belongingness	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.062)	Low confidence (1 study; 2 ES)

	willingness to participate	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.148)	Low confidence (1 study; 3 ES)
	access to justice, rights and public services	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.027)	Low confidence (1 studies; 4 ES)
	civic participation	5	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.281)	Low confidence (5 studies; 24 ES)
	government performance	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.22)	Low confidence (2 studies; 14 ES)
	economic security	2	East Asia & Pacific	Moderate effect (g=0.181)	Low confidence (2 studies; 8 ES)
	physical security	1	East Asia & Pacific	Moderate effect (g=0.181)	Low confidence (1 study; 4 ES)
	Political security	4	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.08)	Low confidence (4 studies; 22 ES)
	intermediate social cohesion outcomes	3	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.193)	Low confidence (3 studies; 9 ES)
Social funds, community-driven development and reconstruction	diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	1	South Asia	No effect (g=0.004)	Low confidence (1 study; 2 ES)
	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	8	South Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific.	No effect (g=-0.005)	Low confidence (8 studies; 27 ES)

social norms regarding violence and atrocities	2	Sub Saharan Africa	No effect (g=-0.001)	Low confidence (2 studies; 6 ES)
feelings of trust & acceptance of diversity	10	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean	Small effect (g=0.037)	Medium confidence (10 studies; 40 ES)
sense of belongingness	1	Latin America & Caribbean	Large effect (g=0.0464)	Low confidence (01studies; 01ES)
willingness to participate or help	11	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America & Caribbean	Moderate effect (g=0.167)	Medium confidence (11 studies; 38 ES)
access to justice, rights and public services	6	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Europe & Central Asia	Large effect (g=0.28)	Medium confidence (6 studies; 30 ES)
civic participation	7	South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.171)	Medium confidence (7 studies; 28 ES)
government performance	8	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean	Small effect (g=0.043)	Low confidence (8 studies; 147 ES)
economic security	11	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Europe & Central Asia	Small effect (g=0.028)	Low confidence (11 studies; 57 ES)
educational security	6	South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.07)	Medium confidence (6 studies; 23 ES)
food security and nutrition and health security	8	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia	Small effect (g=0.08)	Medium confidence (8 studies; 22 ES)

	physical security	3	South Asia	Small effect (g=0.031)	Low confidence (3 studies; 13 ES)
	political security	5	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.028)	Medium confidence (5 studies; 21 ES)
	environmental security	1	South Asia	No effect (g=0.00)	Low confidence (1 study; 2 ES)
	intermediate social cohesion outcomes	2	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa Balkh, Baghlan, Daykundi, Ghor, Herat, Nangarhar provinces, and Democratic Republic of Congo	Small effect (g=0.095)	Low confidence (2 studies; 35 ES)
GOVERNANCE AND JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS					
Foundational state design processes + Transitional political processes (e.g. transitional governments) + Election support	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	11	Global, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia	Harmful effect (g= -0.055)	Low (11 studies 52 effect sizes)
	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	5	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.032)	Low (2 studies with 5 effect sizes)
	willingness to participate or help	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.029)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)

	access to justice, rights and public services	1	Global	Large effect (g=0.351)	Low (1 study with 4 effect sizes)
	civic participation	3	Middle East & North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.103)	Low (3 studies with 23 effect sizes)
	government performance	4	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Middle east and North Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.095)	Low (4 studies with 23 effect sizes)
	transition of power	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Global	Moderate effect (g=0.138)	Low (2 studies with 6 effect sizes)
	economic security	2	Latin America and Caribbean	No effect (g=0.0)	Low (2 studies with 2 effect sizes)
	Physical security	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.137)	Low (2 studies with 2 effect sizes)
	political security	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.165)	Low (2 studies with 15 effect sizes)
Power-sharing	government performance	2	Global	Small effect (g=0.086)	Low (2 studies with 13 effect sizes)
Public sector provision, governance and institutionalisation	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.045)	Low (1 study with 38 effect sizes)
	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	5	Global, Middle east and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g=0.021)	Low (5 studies with 18 effect sizes)

Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.108)	Low (1 study with 12 effect sizes)
Feeling of Trust and acceptance of diversity	2	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.003)	Low (2 study with 70 effect sizes)
Willingness to participate or help	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g= -0.131)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
Access to justice, rights and public services	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.059)	Low (1 study with 12 effect sizes)
Civic participation	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g= -0.007)	Low (1 study with 12 effect sizes)
government performance	5	Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia, Middle East & North Africa, East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g=0.097)	Low (5 studies with 20 effect sizes)
economic security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.167)	Low (1 study with 34 effect sizes)
Food security and nutrition & Health security	1	East Asia & Pacific	Small effect (g=0.039)	Low (1 study with 1 effect sizes)
Intermediate Social Cohesion outcomes	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g= 0.035)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)

Transitional or restorative justice + Justice system support and reform	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	3	Sub Saharan Africa, Global, Latin America & Caribbean	Harmful effect (g= - 0.039)	Low (3 studies with 30 effect sizes)
	Justice	3	East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa and Global	Moderate effect (g= 0.172)	Low confidence (3 studies with 7 effect sizes)
	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities.	2	Latin America & The Caribbean and Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.016)	Low (2 studies with 7 effect sizes)
	Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	7	Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America	Harmful effect (g= - 0.246)	Low (7 studies with 26 effect sizes)
	Feelings of trust and Acceptance of diversity	7	Sub Saharan Africa, Europe & Central Asia and Latin America & Caribbean	Harmful effect (g= - 0.398)	Low (7 studies with 20 effect sizes)
	Sense of belonging	3	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g= 0.902)	Low (3 studies with 8 effect sizes)
	Willingness to participate or help	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.097)	Low (1 studies with 2 effect sizes)
	Access to justice, rights and public services	3	Sub Saharan Africa, Global and Latin America & Caribbean	Small effect (g= 0.007)	Medium (3 studies with 16 effect sizes)
	Civic Participation	3	Sub Saharan Africa & Latin America & Caribbean	Harmful effect (g= - 0.659)	Low (3 studies with 13 effect sizes)

	Government Performance	3	Latin America & Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa and Global	Large effect (g=2.872)	Medium (3 studies with 38 effect sizes)
	Transitions of power	2	Global	Small effect (g= 0.072)	Low confidence (2 studies with 11 effect sizes)
	Economic Security.	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean and Global	Harmful effect (g= - 0.073)	Low confidence (2 studies with 13 effect sizes)
	Food Security and Health security	3	Sub Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean and Globa	Harmful effect (g= - 0.049)	Low confidence (3 studies with 8 effect sizes)
	Political Security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g= 27.383)	Low (1 studies with 5 effect sizes)
	Intermediate social cohesion	5	Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean and Global	Small effect (g=0.065)	Low (5 studies with 18 effect sizes)
Security sector reform	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	1	Latin America and Caribbean	Small effect (g=0.019)	Low (1 study with 5 effect sizes)
	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	3	Global, Latin America & Caribbean, South Asia	Small effect (g=0.045)	Low (3 studies with 22 effect sizes)
	Physical security	1	South Asia	Small effect (g=0.013)	Low (1 study with 13 effect sizes)

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, ESPECIALLY TO ADDRESS INTERGROUP INEQUALITIES					
Mental health and psychosocial support	Nature and scale of violence or atrocities	2	Sub- Saharan Africa	Small effect (g= 0.028)	Low (2 studies with 8 effect sizes)
	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	4	Sub -Saharan - Africa	No effect (g = -0.003)	Medium (4 studies with 11 effect size)
	Feelings of trust and Acceptance of diversity	2	Sub -Saharan Africa	No effect (g = -0.001)	Low (2 studies with 8 Effect size)
	Economic Security	2	Sub - Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.032)	Low (2 studies with 12 effect size)
	Food security & Nutrition and Health security	5	Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g = 0.263)	Medium (5 studies with 25 Effect size)
	Intermediate social cohesion outcome	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g = 0.583)	Low (1 study with 3 effect sizes)
Market development and	diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	2	Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.372)	Low (2 studies with 2 effect sizes)

macroeconomic policy	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	8	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Global, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa	Small effect (g=0.017)	Medium (8 studies with 73 effect sizes)
	feelings of trust and acceptance of diversity	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.076)	Low (1 study with 4 effect sizes)
	economic security	1	Global	Small effect (g=0.013)	Low confidence (1 study; 9 ES)
	intermediate social cohesion outcomes	1	Sub-Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.015)	Low (1 study with 4 effect sizes)
Land reform & NRM	diplomatic relations and peaceful dispute resolution	1	Global, Latin America and Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa	No effect (g=0.003)	Medium (1 study with 1 effect size)
	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	3	East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.001)	Medium (3 studies with 8 effect sizes)
	feelings of trust and diversity	3	Sub - Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America & Caribbean	Large effect (g=0.423)	Low (3 studies with 41 effect sizes)
	willingness to participate or help	2	East Asia and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.487)	Low (2 studies with 2 effect sizes)

	civic participation	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.161)	Low (1 study with 42 effect sizes)
	government performance	1	Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, South Asia, Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.052)	Low (1 study with 63 effect sizes)
	economic security	3	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.207)	Low (3 studies with 36 effect sizes)
	educational security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.383)	Medium (1 study with 1 effect size)
	food security and nutrition and health security	1	Sub- Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.599)	Medium (1 study with 4 effect sizes)
	environmental security	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Global, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa	Large effect (g=0.908)	Low (2 studies with 4 effect sizes)
	intermediate social cohesion outcomes	1	Sub- Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.826)	Medium (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
Training + Job creation (including public works)	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	7	Asia, Middle East, Global	No effect (g=0.01)	Medium (7 studies with 41 effect sizes)
	social norms regarding violence and atrocities	6	Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Global	Small effect (g=0.1)	Low (6 studies with 41 effect sizes)

Feelings of trust & Acceptance of diversity	5	Middle East and North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa	Large effect (g=0.239)	Low (5 studies with 43 effect sizes)
sense of belonging	2	Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.114)	Low (2 studies with 13 effect sizes)
willingness to participate or help	2	Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa	Small effect (g=0.064)	Low (2 studies with 3 effect sizes)
government performance	5	Middle East and North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.051)	Low (5 studies with 29 effect sizes)
economic security	15	Global, Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia	Moderate effect (g=0.188)	Medium (15 studies with 190 effect sizes)
educational security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Harmful effect (g=-0.027)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
food security and nutrition & health security	3	Sub Saharan Africa	Small effect (g=0.036)	Low (3 studies with 6 effect sizes)
physical security	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.154)	Low (1 study with 1 effect size)

	political security	1	Sub Saharan Africa, Global	Harmful effect (g=-0.577)	Low (1 study with 1 effect size)
	intermediate social cohesion	3	Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean	Large effect (g=0.26)	Low (3 studies with 40 effect sizes)
Financial products and services + Cash and in-kind transfers	Diplomatic relations & Peaceful dispute resolution	1	Global	Harmful effect (g = -0.065)	Low (1 study with 2 effect sizes)
	nature and scale of violence or atrocities	7	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia & Pacific, Global, Latin America & The Caribbean	No effect (g=0.008)	Low (7 studies with 28 effect sizes)
	Social norms regarding violence and atrocities	7	Global, Middle East & North Africa, Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean	Harmful effect (g= -0.007)	Low confidence (7 studies with 48 effect sizes)
	Feelings of trust and Acceptance of diversity	7	Global, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America & Caribbean and Middle East & North Africa	Small effect (g=0.05)	Medium (7 studies with 101 effect sizes)
	Willingness to participate or to help	3	Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East & North Africa	small effect (g=0.047)	Medium (3 studies with 20 effect sizes)

	Sense of belonging	1	Sub Saharan Africa	Moderate Effect (g =0.112)	Low confidence (1 study with 10 effect sizes)
	Civic Participation	2	Sub Saharan Africa and Global	No effect (g=0.056)	Low confidence (2 studies 10 effect sizes)
	Government Performances	4	Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia	Harmful effect (g= -0.028)	Low (4 studies with 46 effect sizes)
	Economic Security	6	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Global and Middle East & North Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.103)	Low (6 studies with 162 effect sizes)
	Education Security	2	Sub Saharan Africa and Middle East & North Africa	Moderate effect (g=0.105)	Low (2 studies with 8 effect sizes)
	Food security and nutrition & Health security	5	Sub Saharan Africa, South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa	Small effect (g=0.114)	Medium (5 studies with 61 effect sizes)
	Physical Security	2	South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa and Global	Harmful effect (g= -0.027)	Low confidence (2 studies with 5 effect sizes)
	Political Security	1	Sub Saharan Africa and Global	Harmful effect g= (-0.134)	Low (1 study with 1 effect sizes)

Infrastructure investment	diplomatic relations & peaceful dispute resolution	1	Global	Moderate effect (g=0.153)	Low (1 study with 1 effect size)
	nature and scale of violence and atrocities	3	Middle East and North Africa, Global	No effect (g=0)	Low (3 studies with 9 effect sizes)